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INTRODUCTION 
As a quintessential civil rights issue, the struggle for equal educational 
opportunity for students with disabilities whose families have few 
resources is waged daily from the parapets of the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),2 a complex entitlement statute. 
Dissimilar to the progress made under the IDEA for their wealthier peers, 
low-income3 children are not reaping the educational benefits that effective 
advocacy has achieved for students with disabilities who can afford 
determined advocates, skilled counsel, and knowledgeable experts to 
navigate the highly technical mandates of the statute and corresponding 
                                                          
 2. See generally 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-82 (2006) (noting the Act was amended in 
2004, after long debate and substantial changes).  While consciously dubbed the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act or IDEIA, it continues, with 
congressional approbation, to be popularly known as IDEA.  Id. § 1400(a). 
 3. See COLIN ONG-DEAN, DISTINGUISHING DISABILITY: PARENTS, PRIVILEGE, AND 
SPECIAL EDUCATION 5 (2009); David C. Vladeck, In Re Arons: The Plight of the 
“Unrich” in Obtaining Legal Services, in LEGAL ETHICS STORIES 260 (Deborah L. 
Rhode & David Luban eds., 2006) (explaining that neither “low income” nor “poor” 
capture the socio-economic status of these families perhaps as well as “privileged” or 
“unrich”). 
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regulations.4  Among others, these benefits include identification and 
certification under the IDEA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 
(Section 504);5 development of an enforceable Individualized Education 
Program (IEP),6 with a continuum of services calibrated to the precise 
needs of each eligible child; rich compensatory services for the failure of 
school systems to comply with the requirements of a Free Appropriate 
Public Education (FAPE);7 the provision of a focused private education, in 
a residential setting if appropriate; protections from school discipline, 
including continuing educational services following more than ten days of 
out-of-school suspension, and the formulation of a staged transition plan to 
ensure meaningful opportunities upon a student’s departure from the school 
system.8 
The data is mounting to support the thesis that students from families 
without resources are systematically deprived of educational outcomes that 
would allow them to pursue gainful employment or further educational 
opportunities.9  The links between poverty, race, and disability are “well-
documented.”10  Low-income students with disabilities are more frequently 
pushed out of public education through punitive discipline, sheer neglect, 
or other more subtle strategies.11  Low-income students of color with 
                                                          
 4. See generally COLIN ONG-DEAN, supra note 3; Vladeck, supra note 3, at 258-
61. 
 5. See generally § 1400 (2006); 29 U.S.C. § 794. 
 6. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(14) (explaining that an Individualized Education 
Program, or IEP, is “a written statement for each child with a disability that is 
developed, reviewed, and revised” subject to the conditions section 1414(d)). 
 7. See id. § 1401(9); 34 C.F.R. § 300.13 (2011); Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 
176, 3041 (1982) (noting that FAPE is the cornerstone of the IEP. FAPE is defined as 
special education and related services that: (A) have been provided at public expense, 
under public supervision and direction, and without charge; (B) meet the standards of 
the State educational agency; (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, 
or secondary school education in the State involved; and (D) are provided in 
conformity with the individualized education program required under section 1414(d)); 
see also Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 368 (1985) 
(explaining how the failure to provide FAPE gives rise to a claim for compensatory 
education or services and that although this remedy was not found in the statute itself, 
it was judicially constructed under the theory of tuition reimbursement). 
 8. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(34)(c) (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 300.43 (2006). 
 9. See generally Thomas Hehir & Sue Gamm, Special Education: From Legalism 
to Collaboration, in LAW AND SCHOOL REFORM: SIX STRATEGIES FOR PROMOTING 
EDUCATIONAL EQUITY 205, 229 (Jay P. Heubert ed., 1998) (discussing suspicion of 
special education system by parents of children who could benefit from such 
opportunities, but do not). 
 10. See id. (describing specific studies that outline the differential rates of special 
education). 
 11. See Daniel J. Losen & Kevin G. Welner, Discrimination in Our Public 
Schools: Comprehensive Legal Challenges to Inadequate Special Education Services 
for Minority Children, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 447-48 (2001); Dean Hill 
Rivkin, Legal Advocacy and Education Reform: Litigating School Exclusion, 75 TENN. 
L. REV. 265, 272-76 (2008). 
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unidentified educational disabilities are disproportionately referred for 
prosecution in juvenile court.12  If scrupulously observed by school 
systems, and rigorously enforced, the IDEA has the power to stem this 
phenomenon.13  The paucity of lawyers and advocates who toil to represent 
disempowered families and children in special education matters keenly 
know that the unmet legal needs in this arena are prodigious, and the 
remedies for this often invisible segment of children are elusive.  In this 
unequal netherworld, can an entitlement statute such as the IDEA 
accomplish more for the very children who need the IDEA’s educational 
services the most? 
The obstacles that families without resources face in the IDEA are 
compounded by the increasingly technical nature of the IDEA and the 
inability of these families to retain professionals to assist in navigating the 
intricacies of disability definitions, evaluation processes, the development 
of IEPs, the complex of procedural safeguards, among other provisions in 
the statute.14  Lack of access to attorneys vastly worsens this plight.15  This 
Article does not diminish the power of some parents, of whatever means, 
compellingly to articulate the needs of their children and to advocate for 
appropriate services and supports.  This is a democratizing feature of the 
IDEA that will and should persist.  But in the current landscape of 
retrenchment—at the school system level, in Congress, and in the courts—
                                                          
 12. See Mark McWilliams & Mark P. Fancher, Undiagnosed Students With 
Disabilities Trapped In The School-To-Prison Pipeline, 89 MICH. B.J. 28, 30 (2010) 
(recognizing that when students leave education programs they often wind up in the 
slippery pipeline towards prison); see also DANIEL P. MEARS & LAUDAN Y. ARON, 
URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR., ADDRESSING THE NEEDS OF YOUTH WITH 
DISABILITIES IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE CURRENT STATE OF KNOWLEDGE ii 
(2003), available at 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410885_youth_with_disabilities.pdf. 
 13. See generally NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, BACK TO SCHOOL ON CIVIL 
RIGHTS: ADVANCING THE FEDERAL COMMITMENT TO LEAVE NO CHILD BEHIND 57 
(2000) [hereinafter NCD REP. 2000], available at 
http://www.ncd.gov/publications/2000/Jan252000 (addressing a letter to the President 
outlining NCD’s independent analyses); CATHERINE Y. KIM ET AL., THE SCHOOL-TO-
PRISON-PIPELINE: STRUCTURING LEGAL REFORM 55-56 (2010) (describing the policies 
and practices that create the “pipeline” with many entry points, including under-
resourced schools). 
 14. Compare David Neal & David Kirp, The Allure of Legalization Reconsidered: 
The Case of Special Education, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (1985) (discussing 
how legalization shaped special education policy and the effects of legalization on the 
institutions into which it is introduced), with Hehir & Gamm, supra note 9, and Perry 
A. Zirkel, The Over-Legalization of Special Education, 195 ED. LAW REP. 35 (2005) 
(arguing that it is beyond the scope of the article to debate whether the claim that the 
IDEA has “over-legalized” special education is valid or not). 
 15. See generally Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988) (stating that lawyers on the 
frontline of representing at-risk children in IDEA disputes value the rights-based rules 
and regulations embodied in the IDEA, and that a deregulated, less legalistic regime 
could herald a return to the era when schools possessed unchecked discretion, which 
operated to the profound detriment of students with disabilities). 
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the more “smart” corrections that advocates and lawyers can formulate, the 
greater the likelihood that at least some will be adopted when the IDEA is 
up for its next reauthorization, or enlightened states, through legislation, 
regulations, or adoption of best practices, will seek to level the unequal 
playing field that this Article traverses. 
This Article will (1) focus on the most salient architectural features of 
the IDEA that are theoretically designed to protect and assert the rights of 
all affected children and parents; (2) analyze how these features 
disproportionately fail children from families without financial resources; 
and (3) make modest suggestions for improvements to the legal regime 
under the IDEA.  The full agenda for legislative or court adoption that is 
proposed in this Article may seem infeasible at this time.  But just as the 
pendulum dramatically swung in 1975 when the IDEA was first enacted, 
there is hope that, given the country’s increasing focus on improving 
educational outcomes for all children, humanitarian impulses will 
inevitably rise again and recognize that all students with disabilities—
regardless of their financial status—are entitled to the full benefits of this 
remarkable remedial law.16 
I. THE UNEQUAL DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE IDEA 
There are almost seven million children receiving special education 
services under the IDEA.17  Most of these children come from families with 
limited resources that do not have access to legal services.18  Of all the 
disabled children eligible for special education services under the IDEA, 
one-quarter (approximately 2 million) live below the poverty line and two-
thirds (approximately 4.5 million) live in households with incomes of 
                                                          
 16. Our ambition is limited.  A full-scale re-evaluation of the entire IDEA and, for 
example, its relationships to important national initiatives such as No Child Left 
Behind (NCLB), is beyond the scope of this piece. 
 17. See U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Office of Special Educ. Programs, Data Analysis Sys. 
(DANS), OMB # 1820-0043: Children with Disabilities Receiving Special Education 
Under Part B of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, Table 1-1: Children 
and students served under IDEA, Part B, by age, group, and state: Fall 2008, Table 8-
1: Number of infants and toddlers, ages birth through 2 and 3 and older, and 
percentage of population, receiving early intervention services under IDEA, Part C, by 
age and state: Fall 2008 (data updated as of Aug. 3, 2009) [hereinafter U.S. Dep’t of 
Educ., Tables], available at https://www.ideadata.org/arc_toc10.asp (describing the 
most recent count of students available from 2008, which shows that 6,941,838 
children are served through Parts B and C of the IDEA).  The breakdown is as follows: 
342,985 children from birth through age two receive early intervention services, 
709,004 children between the ages of three and five receive preschool services, and 
5,889,849 children between the ages of six and twenty-one receive school-age special 
education services. Id. 
 18. See generally Brief for Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates, Inc. et al. 
as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners,  Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City 
Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007) (No. 05-983), 2006 WL 37403678 (discussing a 
family, despite being unable to afford an attorney, that nevertheless was able to raise 
IEP challenges on behalf of their child). 
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$50,000 or less.19  Almost 20% of children receiving special education 
services are living in households with a yearly income of $15,000 or less, 
compared to 12.5% in general education households; and 36% of children 
receiving special education services live in households with an income of 
$25,000 or less, compared with 24% of children in the general population.20  
School systems, moreover, spend disproportionate sums on private school 
tuition, which predominantly benefits families with the means to hire a 
lawyer and litigate when necessary.21 
Access to attorneys in the special education realm is relatively rare.22  
This reality is consistent with recent studies documenting the unmet legal 
needs of Americans.23  A recent study by the American Bar Association 
found that 60 to 70% of all Americans cannot afford lawyers to meet their 
non-routine legal needs.24  For the poorest parents, legal services are simply 
not affordable, and limited resources restrict free legal aid to a fortunate 
few.25 
Under the IDEA, due process hearings and mediation are underutilized 
and are used mostly by wealthy families with financial means for a private 
school funding remedy. This phenomenon largely explains the increase in 
                                                          
 19. See generally MARY WAGNER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE CHILDREN WE 
SERVE: THE DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF ELEMENTARY AND MIDDLE SCHOOL 
STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES AND THEIR HOUSEHOLDS 29 (2002), available at 
http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED475794.pdf. 
 20. See NAT’L DISSEMINATION CTR. FOR CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES, WHO ARE 
THE CHILDREN RECEIVING SPECIAL EDUCATION SERVICES 6 (2003), available at 
http://nichcy.org/wp-content/uploads/docs/rb2.pdf. 
 21. See Emily Blumberg, Forest Grove School District v. T.A., 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 163, 164 (2010) (discussing that although the decision in Forest Grove School 
District v. T.A. strengthens IDEA, it does not improve special education provided to 
low income students); Daniela Caruso, Bargaining and Distribution in Special 
Education, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 171, 172-73 (2004-05) (emphasizing the 
uneven distribution of special education services); Juan Gonzalez, Education 
Department’s Special-Ed Help Mostly Goes to the City’s Rich, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 
15, 2010, http://articles.nydailynews.com/2010-12-15/local/27084320_1_special-
education-pupils-private-school-tuition (stating that $140 million is spent in New York 
City on private school tuition). 
 22. See generally COUNCIL OF PARENT ATTORNEYS AND ADVOCATES, 
http://www.copaa.org (last visited June 17, 2011) (stating that the national special 
education bar is small, largely composed of solo practitioners, small firms, legal 
services and nonprofit firms, and a handful of pro bono lawyers from large law firms).  
The Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates (COPAA) serves as a clearinghouse of 
assistance to this specialized bar. Id. 
 23. See M. Brendhan Flynn, In Defense of Maroni: Why Parents Should be 
Allowed to Proceed Pro Se in IDEA Cases, 80 IND. L.J. 881, 892 (2005) (emphasizing 
that parents should be allowed to proceed pro se to enforce both procedural violations 
and substantive claims). 
 24. Vladeck, supra note 3, at 259. 
 25. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE 
CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 4 (2005), available 
at http://www.lsc.gov/justicegap.pdf. 
7
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the number of special education court decisions.26  As can be expected 
families with attorneys prevail more frequently in due process hearings 
than those who proceed pro se.27  The canard that IDEA litigation in federal 
courts is over-utilized by families has been refuted by a recent empirical 
analysis of federal court filings, which found that, relative to the number of 
due process filings,28 there is little IDEA litigation in the federal courts, and 
the courts’ role in implementing the statute has been notably constrained.29 
The IDEA’s remedial scheme and procedural provisions are also 
designed to operate in a system where there is overall compliance with the 
statutory scheme.  Many states, however, are not in compliance with the 
IDEA.30  The Department of Education recently determined that only 
twenty-eight states were found to have met the IDEA compliance 
standards.31 
When a district is out of compliance with the statute, many of the 
provisions designed to protect parents’ and children’s rights are not 
effective because the procedural protections and due process provisions 
presume compliance.32  For example, the IDEA presumes that children are 
                                                          
 26. See generally Christina Samuels, Special Education Court Decisions on the 
Rise, EDUC. WEEK (Jan. 28, 2011, 9:24 AM), 
http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/speced/2011/01/special_education_court_decisi.html 
(interviewing Perry A. Zirkel about his forthcoming article in the West Education Law 
Reporter and stating that from 2000 to 2010 there were approximately 8,000 reported 
IDEA decisions in both state and federal courts). 
 27. See MELANIE ARCHER, ACCESS AND EQUITY IN THE DUE PROCESS SYSTEM: 
ATTORNEY REPRESENTATION AND HEARING OUTCOMES IN ILLINOIS, 1997-2002 7-9 
(2002), available at http://www.dueprocessillinois.org/Access.pdf (discussing how 
attorney representation in due process hearings increases parents’ chances of prevailing 
equal to that of school districts); Perry A. Zirkel & Gina Scala, Due Process Hearing 
Systems Under the IDEA: A State-by-State Survey, 21 J. Disability Pol’y Stud. 3 (2010) 
(discussing that between 2000 and 2010, 65% of due process hearings were won by 
school districts). 
 28. Zirkel & Scala, supra note 27, at 4-6 (2010) (providing that during 2008-09 
there were 2,033 adjudicated due process hearings, with four states—New York, 
California, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania—and the District of Columbia accounting 
for 85% of these cases and noting that the number of adjudicated due process hearings 
decreased in the last decade).  
 29. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Judiciary’s Now-Limited Role in Special 
Education, in FROM SCHOOLHOUSE TO COURTHOUSE: THE JUDICIARY’S ROLE IN 
AMERICAN EDUCATION, 121, 122 (Joshua M. Dunn & Marvin R. West eds., 2009) 
[hereinafter Bagenstos, Judiciary’s Role] (arguing that courts have made “little direct 
difference in the treatment of students with disabilities”). 
 30. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DETERMINATION LETTERS ON STATE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF IDEA 1 (2009) [hereinafter DEP’T OF EDUC. IMPLEMENTATION 
LETTERS], available at http://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/monitor/factsheet-
2009.pdf (outlining states’ performances in fulfilling the IDEA’s mandates). 
 31. See id. at 2 (noting which states require further assistance to comply with the 
IDEA). 
 32. See Margaret M. Wakelin, Comment, Challenging Disparities in Special 
Education: Moving Parents from Disempowered Team Members to Ardent Advocates, 
3 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y. 263, 263-64 (2008) (describing the failure of enforcement on 
federal and state levels). 
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thoroughly and accurately evaluated in every area of suspected disability in 
a non-discriminatory fashion, and that the professionals conducting the 
evaluations will not have their hands tied by restrictions on what can be 
recommended.33  Instead, in some districts, children do not receive 
thorough and adequate evaluations, and district employees are bound by 
blanket policies and even moratoria.34  Thus, the entire process breaks 
down.35  Poor families suffer most from this phenomenon.36 
II. EQUITABLE AND STATUTORY IDEA REMEDIES HAVE LIMITED 
EFFICACY FOR FAMILIES WITHOUT FINANCIAL RESOURCES 
A. Overview of the IDEA 
1.  The Basic Requirements as Envisioned in 1975: A Free and Appropriate 
Public Education 
A complete discussion of the IDEA is beyond the scope of this Article. 
The following overview, however, sets the context for a discussion of 
violations and remedies that are at the heart of this undertaking’s critique. 
The IDEA, first enacted as the Education for All Handicapped Children 
Act (EAHCA),37 was originally adopted to rectify deficiencies in the 
educational opportunities afforded to students with disabilities.38  Congress 
recognized that without federal pressure school districts frequently did not 
serve disabled children properly, but instead excluded them from school, 
warehoused them in segregated special education classes, or left them in 
regular classes with no services to ensure that they could learn.39  The 
                                                          
 33. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)-(d) (2006). 
 34. See McWilliams & Fancher, supra note 12, at 30 (discussing the failure of 
school systems to comply with their obligation to identify all children with potential 
educational disabilities, called “Child Find” under IDEA).  The restrictions referred to 
in the text are well-known to special education lawyers through member-restricted 
listservs. 
 35. See generally Erin Phillips, Note, When Parents Aren’t Enough: External 
Advocacy in Special Education, 117 YALE L.J. 1802 (2008) (providing a keen analysis 
of why the intended system under IDEA fails in its promise). 
 36. See Caruso, supra note 21, at 178-79 (explaining that disempowered families, 
who do not possess the “bargaining power” of families with access to resources, fare 
worse under the IDEA). 
 37. See generally The Education for all Handicapped Children Act, Pub. L. 94-142, 
89 Stat. 77 (1975).  Fifteen years after the EACHA became law, the Act was amended 
and renamed the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1991 and 
for purposes of this Article, all references are to IDEA.  See Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. 102-119, 105 Stat. 587 
(1991). 
 38. See Jeffrey J. Zettel, PUBLIC LAW 94-142 THE EDUCATION FOR ALL 
HANDICAPPED CHILDREN ACT: AN OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL LAW 4-5 (1977), 
available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED140554.pdf. 
 39. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 606 (1988) (ruling that districts cannot 
remove a child for more than ten days without making a determination whether the 
9
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statute offered funding to states, in exchange for the provision of special 
education services in compliance with the statute’s provisions.40 
Throughout the years, this law was reauthorized, with eight name 
changes.  The current version of the statute was adopted in 2004.41  Each 
time the IDEA was reauthorized, the Department of Education promulgated 
regulations offering explanatory guidance to the states. Additionally, the 
statute requires states and districts to adopt laws, regulations, policies, and 
procedures consistent with the IDEA.42  Although the Department of 
Education, in theory, has the ability to ensure IDEA enforcement through 
withholding of funding, the Department generally takes a hands-off 
approach, despite the fact that many states and districts across the country 
are significantly out of compliance with the law.43 
The primary purpose of the IDEA is to ensure that every child with a 
disability, who is therefore eligible for special education services under the 
statute, receives a FAPE, regardless of whether the student is in a public or 
private school, out of school, homeless, or in a hospital, jail, prison, or 
foster care placement.  There is no setting, location, or situation, except for 
parent refusal, that justifies an eligible child being denied a FAPE.  The 
IDEA stipulates that students may be entitled to special education services 
until age twenty-one.44 
With an obligation to provide FAPE to all eligible children, every school 
district is mandated to engage in a process known as “Child Find,” which 
requires the district to identify, locate, and evaluate all children with 
disabilities, regardless of the severity of their disabilities, who are in need 
of special education and related services.45  Because the Child Find 
obligation is an affirmative one, IDEA does not require parents to request 
that the district evaluate their children.46  This duty is triggered when the 
district “has reason to suspect a disability, and reason to suspect that special 
education services may be needed to address that disability.”47 
                                                          
behavior constitutes a manifestation of the child’s disability). 
 40. See id. at 597; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1416(b)(2)(C)(ii)(II) (2006) (mandating that 
each state must submit a plan to the United States Department of Education 
establishing compliance with the IDEA’s provisions upon which funding is approved). 
 41. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-82. 
 42. Id. § 1415(a). 
 43. See, e.g., DEP’T OF EDUC. IMPLEMENTATION LETTERS, supra note 30, at 2 
(acknowledging the individual states that are not meeting the IDEA’s mandates and 
that require assistance and intervention under the IDEA program). 
 44. § 1412(a)(1)(A). 
 45. § 1412(a)(3). 
 46. See Reid ex rel. Reid v. District of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 518 (D.C. Cir. 
2005) (“School districts may not ignore disabled students’ needs, nor may they await 
parental demands before providing special instruction.”). 
 47. See Dep’t of Educ. v. Cari Rae S., 158 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1194 (D. Haw. 2001) 
(emphasis added); see also Reg’l Sch. Dist. No. 9 Bd. of Educ. v. Mr. & Mrs. M. ex 
10
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States and districts must also develop a “continuum” of special education 
placements, which include delivery of instruction in regular classes, special 
classes, home, and hospital settings.48  All students are entitled to FAPE in 
the Least Restrictive Environment (LRE).  Under the IDEA, this means that 
children with disabilities should, to the maximum extent practicable, be 
educated with children who are not disabled.49 Once a child is suspected of 
having a disability, the next step is a referral to the school district for a 
comprehensive evaluation to assess the child in every area of suspected 
disability.50 
After the evaluation, a team of professionals and the parent must meet to 
determine whether the child is eligible for special education services.51  To 
be eligible, children must fit into one of eleven disabling conditions52 and 
require special education to receive a FAPE and to ensure their rights are 
protected.53 
If a child is deemed eligible for special education services, an IEP must 
be developed.54  The IEP is a “blueprint” for the delivery of services.55  It 
must be created by the a multidisciplinary team with several required 
                                                          
rel. M.M., No. 3:07-CV-01484 (WWE), 2009 WL 2514064, at *12 (D. Conn. Aug. 7, 
2009) (holding that the student’s hospital stay was a clear sign of a disability that was 
overlooked by the school); El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Richard R. ex rel. C., 567 F. 
Supp. 2d 918, 950-51 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (holding that the student’s repeated failure to 
progress with the section 504 accommodations provided triggered the “child find” 
obligation to refer the student to special education services; moreover, the student 
failing the standardized test along with having difficulties in reading, math, and science 
were clear signals that an evaluation was necessary); Williamson Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. 
C.K. ex rel. C., No. 3:07-0826, 2009 WL 499386, at *18 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 27, 2009) 
(quoting 34 C.F.R. § 300.101(c)(1) (2007)) (affirming the holding that FAPE was not 
provided merely because the child managed to earn average grades and passed to the 
next grade and that the school “has clearly misapplied or ignored [the regulation]”); 
Scott v. District of Columbia, No. Civ. A. 03-1672 DAR, 2006 WL 1102839, at *9 
(D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2006) (declaring that the “child find” obligation is triggered where 
teachers knew of the student’s ADHD diagnosis as well as the student’s inability to 
“stay on task academically and complete his assignments”). 
 48. § 1415(k)(1)(D)(i). 
 49. See § 1412(a)(5)(A) (stating that under the LRE standard, disabled children 
should only be educated separately from non-disabled children in circumstances where 
the child’s disability is of such severity that education with his or her non-disabled 
peers cannot be achieved satisfactorily). 
 50. § 1414(a)(1)(A)-(B), (D).  This referral can be made by a school staff member, 
parent, doctor, or judge.  34 C.F.R. § 300.527 (2011). 
 51. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(4)(A). 
 52. See id. § 1401(3)(A) (listing the IDEA qualifying disabling conditions as: (1) 
intellectual disabilities, (2) hearing impairments, (3) speech or language impairments, 
(4) visual impairments, (5) serious emotional disturbance, (6) orthopedic impairments, 
(7) autism, (8) traumatic brain injury, (9) other health impairments, (10) specific 
learning disabilities, and (11) children who need special education and related 
services). 
 53. § 1400(d)(1)(A)-(B). 
 54. § 1414(d)(2)(A). 
 55. § 1414(d)(1)(A). 
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members, including the parent, the child’s special education teacher, a 
general education teacher, an individual who can interpret the instructional 
implications of the assessments, and the child (if appropriate).56  The IEP 
must contain, among other things, a statement of the child’s present levels 
of academic achievement and functional performance, measurable annual 
goals, a description of the metrics to be used to measure whether the child 
is achieving his or her annual goals, and an explanation of the extent to 
which the child will not be participating in regular classes with non-
disabled children.57  The IEP must also set forth all of the special education 
services, related services and supplementary aids and supports the child is 
to receive.58 
Following the development of the IEP, the team must decide on the 
child’s placement.59  At a minimum, the IEP team should meet annually to 
assess whether the child is making progress, to make any adjustments to the 
IEP and placement to ensure progress, and to determine whether the child 
continues to be eligible for services.  Every three years, at a minimum, the 
district must conduct a reevaluation.  Additionally, for students over the 
age of sixteen, the IEP process must include the development of 
measurable postsecondary goals to ensure that a careful plan of transition is 
followed.60 
2. Procedural Safeguards 
To further the goal of providing FAPE for all children, the IDEA creates 
procedural safeguards “to insure the full participation of the parents and 
proper resolution of substantive disagreements” concerning the delivery of 
special education services.61  These safeguards are not simply “procedural” 
rights; they are the keys to guaranteeing a substantively appropriate 
education.62  School districts that receive IDEA funds are required to 
“establish and maintain procedures . . . [and] to ensure that children with 
disabilities and their parents are guaranteed procedural safeguards” with 
respect to the FAPE provisions of the IDEA.63  The congressional intent 
                                                          
 56. See § 1414(d)(1)(B) (mandating that if a child may be suspected of having a 
learning disability, the team must also include at least one team member, other than the 
child’s regular teacher, to observe the child’s academic performance in the regular 
classroom). 
 57. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)-(V). 
 58. § 1414(d)(1)(A), (d)(3)(A)-(C). 
 59. § 1414(e). 
 60. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VIII). 
 61. Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 368 (1985).  See 
generally § 1415(b)(6)(A) (setting forth the guaranteed procedural safeguards 
determined by Congress to protect every child’s right to a free appropriate public 
education). 
 62. See Heldman ex rel. T.H. v. Sobol, 962 F.2d 148, 150-51 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 63. § 1415(a). 
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was not to mandate a particular level of service, but instead, to install a set 
of procedures that should result in an offer of FAPE.64 
Procedural protections are the core of the IDEA.  Those protections can 
be divided into a few separate categories: informed parental consent, 
parental notice, parent participation in the IEP process, mediation, litigation 
(administrative and court), state complaints, independent evaluations, and 
protections for children with behavior problems and those who commit 
disciplinary infractions.65  The due process protections must be viewed 
within the context of the entire procedural framework. 
State complaints, mediation, and litigation are the three mechanisms 
contained in the IDEA that can be used by individuals to challenge the 
decisions and actions of districts and other responsible agencies.66  Any 
person, including a parent, may file a complaint with the applicable state 
agency alleging a violation of the law.67  The state agency must investigate 
and render a decision within a required timeframe.68  The IDEA also 
strongly encourages alternative dispute resolution through mediation.69  
This process is confidential and the mediation agreement is enforceable in 
federal court. 70 
Except for class action lawsuits, where administrative remedies have 
been exhausted or proven futile, litigation in the special education arena 
typically begins with an administrative due process hearing.71  Most states 
adopt a one-tiered hearing system, with appeals filed directly with a federal 
                                                          
 64. See § 1400(d)(1)(A) (“The purposes of this chapter are to ensure that all 
children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that 
emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs 
and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living.”). 
 65. See § 1415(a)-(b) (outlining procedural safeguards required by the State or 
educational agency to be put in place). 
 66. § 1415(b)(6), (e)-(f). 
 67. § 1415(b)(6). 
 68. § 1415(c)(2)(B)(i)(I). 
 69. § 1415(e). 
 70. § 1415(e)(2)(F)(i), (iii). 
 71. See, e.g., Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 327 (1988) (noting that bypassing the 
administrative process is warranted when exhaustion is futile or inadequate); Frazier v. 
Fairhaven Sch. Comm., 276 F.3d 52, 64 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that plaintiffs must 
exhaust administrative process under IDEA before seeking purely money damages 
under § 1983 unless exhaustion would be futile); Hoeft v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 
967 F.2d 1298, 1304 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that, if plaintiffs wish to waive the 
IDEA’s exhaustion requirement, they must demonstrate that “the underlying purpose of 
exhaustion would not be furthered by enforcing the requirement); Lester H. ex rel. 
Octavia P. v. Gilhool, 916 F. 2d 865, 869 (3d Cir. 1990) (explaining that a student who 
has failed to receive adequate education is entitled to administrative remedies 
beginning with a due process hearing); Ass’n for Retarded Citizens of Ala., Inc. v. 
Teague, 830 F.2d 158, 162 (11th Cir. 1987) (affirming the district court’s ruling that, if 
after a few due process hearings, it becomes clear that the process is overloaded, a 
federal court action seeking relief after the EHA would then be appropriate). 
13
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district or state trial court.72  Due process hearings and appeals garner the 
most attention from policy makers and politicians in terms of the alleged 
“cost” of due process.  Yet, out of almost seven million children receiving 
special education services through IDEA Parts B and C,73 only 2,033 
families participated in hearings that resulted in a final decision.74 
A parent may initiate an impartial hearing to resolve complaints 
concerning “any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or 
educational placement of the child . . . .”75  A decision rendered in an 
impartial hearing is final, absent a timely appeal.76  Independent Hearing 
Officers have the power to order a school system to “take any number of 
actions in order to correct violations of IDEA . . . including modifying an 
IEP, implementing an existing IEP it has failed to carry out, providing a 
particular placement, [or] providing a particular related service.”77  Other 
available remedies include retroactive reimbursement for private placement 
or services, advance payment for placement or services, and compensatory 
education.  Parents who prevail at an impartial hearing are entitled to 
enforce hearing officer orders in federal court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 
1983.78  Parents have enforceable rights in the procedural protections of the 
                                                          
 72. See Zirkel & Scala, supra note 27, at 6-7 (finding that the most recent survey 
claimed that forty-one states have one-tier systems and ten states have two-tier 
systems); see also § 1415(g)(1)-(2) (in a two-tier system, parties must first exhaust an 
appeal to an appeals officer or board before filing in court). 
 73. See U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Tables, supra note 17. 
 74. See Zirkel & Scala, supra note 27, at 4-5 (discussing the total number of 
adjudications in the United States for fiscal year 2008-2009 as well as the breakdown 
by the highest five jurisdictions by state). 
 75. § 1415(b)(6), (f). 
 76. § 1415(i). 
 77. EILEEN L. ORDOVER & KATHLEEN B. BOUNDY, EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS OF 
CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES; A PRIMER FOR ADVOCATES 59 (Sharon Schmuck ed., 
1991); see § 1415(e)(1), (2)(B) (discussing factors of the mediation process, including 
the requirement that the hearing officer with whom the State educational agencies or 
Local educational agencies contract be qualified as “a parent training and information 
center, . . . community parent resource center in the State, [or] an appropriate 
alternative dispute resolution entity”). 
 78. See § 1415(l) (requiring that plaintiffs must exhaust the IDEA’s administrative 
remedies before bringing claims under other federal statutes, such as §§ 504 and 1983 
if the plaintiffs are seeking remedies that are also available under the IDEA); Nieves-
Marquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 115-16 (1st Cir. 2003) (enforcing plaintiffs’ 
order when the school system neither appealed from, nor complied with, the order); 
Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi, 832 F.2d 748, 755 (2d Cir. 1987) (granting parents standing to 
bring a § 1983 action based on IDEA violations); D.D. ex rel. V.D. v. N.Y.C. Bd. of 
Educ., No. CV-03-2489 (DGT), 2004 WL 633222, at *20 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2004) 
(allowing parents to enforce an IDEA claim under § 1983); R.B. ex rel. L.B. v. Bd. of 
Educ., 99 F. Supp. 2d 411, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (asserting jurisdiction over claims 
when the plaintiff prevailed at the hearing and the hearing officer granted relief that the 
defendants failed to enforce); Blackman v. District of Columbia, 59 F. Supp. 2d 37, 42 
(D.D.C. 1999) (stating that plaintiffs had enforceable right to implementation of 
hearing officers’ determinations and settlement agreements including immediate 
injunctive relief); see also Jeremy H. ex rel. W.E. Hunter v. Mount Lebanon Sch. Dist., 
95 F.3d 272, 279 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that parents can enforce orders of special 
14
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IDEA and need not show particularized injury or prejudice as a result of 
such violation.79 
B.  The IDEA’s Private School Tuition Remedy Constitutes an Inherent 
Structural Bias that Disproportionately Benefits Wealthy Families 
When a public school district fails to provide FAPE, a parent may obtain 
tuition payment for his or her child to attend a private school under the 
IDEA as a remedy through an impartial hearing and/or judicial proceeding.  
Unfortunately, as discussed in greater detail below, this right is limited for 
families without financial resources. Among other barriers, private schools 
themselves may require up-front payments, contracts, or deposits, or have 
admissions policies that have the effect of exclusion. 
The right to private school tuition funding in the absence of FAPE was 
solidified as a remedy by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1985 in the landmark 
Burlington case,80 where the Court ruled parents may seek, as a proper 
remedy, tuition reimbursement for private school when they believe their 
disabled child is not getting an appropriate education at a public 
institution.81  Later, in 1993, in Florence County School District Four v. 
Carter,82 the Supreme Court considered whether parents could obtain a 
similar remedy of tuition reimbursement if they chose to place their child in 
a private school that was not approved by the state’s education department.  
In Carter, the Court held that a parent could seek tuition in a non-approved 
school as a remedy, finding that the right of a child to FAPE trumped the 
administrative and procedural aspects of the IDEA.83  Until 2004, the right 
to tuition payment as a remedy was exclusively one created under the broad 
equitable powers of courts and hearing officers.84 
                                                          
education hearing officers in federal court); Robinson v. Pinderhughes, 810 F.2d 1270, 
1273-75 (4th Cir. 1987) (same); A.T. & I.T. ex rel. Z.T. v. N.Y. Educ. Dep’t, No. 98-
CV-4166 (JG), 1998 WL 765371, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 1998) (same). 
 79. See Heldman ex rel. T.H. v. Sobol, 962 F.2d 148, 157-59 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(allowing challenges to procedures for assigning hearing officers); Blackman v. District 
of Columbia, 277 F. Supp. 2d 71, 80 (D.D.C. 2003) (“[W]hen a plaintiff’s rights to the 
due process hearing are circumscribed in significant ways, a plaintiff need not show 
prejudice in order to demonstrate injury.”); Blackman v. District of Columbia, 28 ED. 
LAW. REP. 1053 (D.D.C. June 3, 1998) (stating that the IDEA creates an enforceable 
right to timely implementation of the determinations of hearing officers and of 
settlements). 
 80. Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (1985). 
 81. Id. at 369-70. 
 82. 1510 U.S. 7 (1993). 
 83. Id. 
 84. See, e.g., Knable ex rel. Knable v. Bexley City Sch. Dist., 238 F.3d 755, 770 
(6th Cir. 2001); Bd. of Educ. v. Kelly E., 207 F.3d 931, 937 (7th Cir. 2000); St. 
Tammany Parish Sch. Bd. v. Louisiana, 142 F.3d 776, 783 (5th Cir. 1998); Gadsby v. 
Grasmick, 109 F.3d 940, 954 (4th Cir. 1997); Oliver v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 
301CV2627N, 2003 WL 22272304, at *4 (N.D. Tex. 2003); Douglas W. ex rel. 
Douglas & Susan W. v. Greenfield Pub. Schs., 164 F. Supp. 2d 157, 171 (D. Mass. 
15
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In 2004, the IDEA was amended and the right to tuition reimbursement 
was expressly codified in the statute in 20 U.S.C. § 1412.85  The IDEA now 
provides that 
[i]f the parents of a child with a disability, who previously received 
special education and related services under the authority of a public 
agency, enroll the child in a private elementary school or secondary 
school without the consent of or referral by the public agency, a court or 
a hearing officer may require the agency to reimburse the parents for the 
cost of that enrollment . . . .86 
The Court had the opportunity to square § 1412 with the holdings of 
Burlington and Carter in the third decision in the reimbursement trilogy, 
Forest Grove School District v. T.A.87  In Forest Grove, the Court 
reaffirmed the availability of relief under § 1415(i), ruling that there is an 
independent basis for funding a private school placement beyond the 
authority granted by 20 U.S.C. § 1412.  The Forest Grove decision held 
that Burlington and Carter authorized reimbursement where FAPE was not 
provided, “without regard to the child’s prior receipt of services.”88  While 
these decisions were issued in the context of a private school tuition 
remedy, funding, they apply to all areas of the IDEA and reinforce the 
general principle that a strict statutory adherence will not be required where 
a child’s right to FAPE is impaired. 
Despite the underlying purpose of the IDEA, the language of the statute 
and the decisions are framed in terms of “reimbursement,” thus drawing 
                                                          
2001); see also Emily S. Rosenblum, Note, Interpreting the 1997 Amendment to the 
IDEA: Did Congress Intend to Limit the Remedy of Private School Tuition 
Reimbursement for Disabled Children?, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2733, 2748-55 (2009) 
(discussing the legislative history and agency interpretation of section 
1412(a)(10)(C)(ii)).  But see Reese ex rel. Reese v. Bd. of Educ., 225 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 
1159 (E.D. Mo. 2002) (citing Eighth Circuit precedent regarding tuition reimbursement 
review, rather than applying a liberal interpretation of the “equitable powers” standard, 
the court narrowly interpreted the Burlington court’s statement that parents “are 
entitled to reimbursement only if a federal court concludes both that the public 
placement violated the IDEA and that the private school placement was proper under 
the Act”). 
 85. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2006). 
 86. Id. 
 87. 129 S. Ct. 2484 (2009). 
 88. Forest Grove, 129 S. Ct. at 2494 n.10.  Section 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) of the 1997 
IDEA amendments generated a split of authority where some courts interpreted the 
amendment to have created a categorical bar on a parent’s eligibility for tuition 
reimbursement while other courts upheld the equitable powers granted to courts in the 
Burlington and Carter decisions. Compare Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy N., 358 F.3d 
150, 158 (1st Cir. 2004) (finding the unilateral enrollment of a disabled child in a 
private school before the public school had the opportunity to provide special education 
services rendered the parents ineligible for tuition reimbursement), with Frank G. v. Bd. 
of Educ., 459 F.3d 356, 374 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that the underlying purpose of the 
IDEA is to provide disabled children with FAPE, and holding that the 1997 
amendments did not limit a court’s equitable power to award tuition reimbursement 
even though the parents unilaterally enrolled their child in a private school). 
16
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into question whether families who cannot afford to pay up front and seek 
reimbursement may use this self-help remedy.  In certain jurisdictions, 
many parents who can afford to pay private tuition and seek reimbursement 
are able to take advantage of this remedy in administrative hearings.  For 
example, in New York City and Washington D.C., tuition reimbursement 
cases account for millions of dollars in special education spending.89  Yet, 
the question of whether a family with limited financial resources may 
obtain private school tuition as a remedy is still unresolved in terms of the 
language of the statute and judicial interpretation.  School districts still 
have the ability to challenge low- and middle-income families from 
successfully obtaining this remedy solely based on income. 
A New York federal district court recently issued a decision of first 
impression, holding squarely that a parent without financial resources may 
obtain payment for tuition owed to a school, even if that parent does not 
have financial resources to pay the tuition and seek reimbursement.90  In 
D.A. v. New York City Department of Education,91 the court concluded, 
first, that the test for tuition funding approved by the U.S. Supreme Court 
in Burlington should be applied to claims of retroactive tuition funding 
based upon dicta in the Court’s decision suggesting that a prospective 
injunction for tuition would be an appropriate remedy.92  The court then 
conducted a review of the other types of cases where courts either awarded 
prospective relief under the IDEA or deemed it appropriate in dicta.93  
                                                          
 89. In New York City, in 2007-2008, schools paid “$89 million in private-school 
tuition for disabled students whose parents had placed them there, up from $53 million 
two years earlier.”  Tamar Lewin, Court Affirms Reimbursement for Special Education, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2009, at A16, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/23education/23special.html.  Meanwhile, in 
Washington D.C., tuition reimbursements “represent fifteen percent of the district’s 
budget.”  Jay P. Greene & Marcus A. Winters, Debunking a Special Education Myth, 
EDUC. NEXT (Mar. 15, 2007), http://educationnext.org/debunking-a-special-education-
myth/.  In a recent case, a private school in Washington D.C., which had received over 
$16 million in tuition reimbursements from the school district and serves a large 
population of disabled children, came under investigation “for lax security, high rates 
of truancy and inadequate academic programs.”  Bill Turque, District Investigates 
Special-Ed School, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com /local/ 
education/district-investigates-special-ed-school/2011/03/17/ABNsizk_story.html. 
 90. Mr. & Mrs. A. ex rel. D.A. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 769 F. Supp. 2d 403, 406 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 91. Id.  
 92. Id. at 421-23 (quoting Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 
359 (1985) (“[I]t seems clear beyond cavil that ‘appropriate’ relief would include a 
prospective injunction directing the school officials to develop and implement at public 
expense an IEP placing the child in a private school.”)). 
 93. See id. at 425-27 (reviewing Draper v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 518 F.3d 1275, 
1285 (11th Cir. 2008) (prospective funding for compensatory education); Sabatini v. 
Corning-Painted Post Area Sch. Dist., 78 F. Supp. 2d 138, 142 (W.D.N.Y. 1999) 
(prospective funding for stay-put placement orders); Connors v. Mills, 34 F. Supp. 2d 
795, 804 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (dicta suggesting prospective tuition funding would be 
appropriate)). 
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Finally, the court set forth an analysis of the federal decisions construing 20 
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii).94 
Finding no case directly on point, the court in D.A. nevertheless 
concluded that in light of the purpose of the IDEA and the broad discretion 
courts have to fashion a remedy under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii), direct 
retroactive tuition remedy is available to families without the resources to 
front the costs of tuition.95  In so ruling, the court concluded that a 
“contrary ruling would be entirely inconsistent with the IDEA’s statutory 
purpose, including its goal of ensuring a FAPE to the least privileged of the 
disabled children in our nation” and would be “irreconcilable with decades 
of case law . . . holding that the exercise of rights under IDEA cannot be 
made to depend on the financial means of a disabled child’s parents.”96 
While this decision was encouraging, no circuit court has ruled on the 
specific question of tuition relief for poor families; and, if decisions in 
other contexts can be read as barometers, the circuits would likely be split 
on this question.  Two decisions highlight the different approaches of 
courts on prospective funding in general.  In Draper v. Atlanta Independent 
School System,97 for example, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the school 
district’s argument that the parent’s request for prospective payment for 
compensatory education was tantamount to damages, and found that the 
school district’s argument would provide wealthy families greater benefits 
under IDEA than poor families.98  The court held that the IDEA “does not 
relegate families who lack the resources to place their children unilaterally 
in private schools to shouldering the burden of proving that the public 
school cannot adequately educate their child before those parents can 
obtain a placement in a private school.”99 
In stark contrast, the First Circuit has held that the private school remedy 
is, effectively, only available for wealthy children.100  In Diaz-Fonseca v. 
Puerto Rico,101 the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s rejection of a 
remedy that would have required the school district to pay future 
educational expenses for the child, finding, under Burlington, that the 
plaintiff was only entitled to “reimbursement” of expenses already 
incurred.102 
                                                          
 94. See D.A., 769 F. Supp. at 427. 
 95. Id. at 427-28. 
 96. Id. at 428. 
 97. 518 F.3d 1275. 
 98. Id. at 1286. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See, e.g., Diaz-Fonseca v. Puerto Rico, 451 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2006); Ms. M. ex 
rel. K.M. v. Portland Sch. Comm., 360 F.3d 267 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 101. 451 F.3d 13. 
 102. Id. at 35, 39. 
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Given the purpose of the IDEA, it is unlikely that either the Supreme 
Court or Congress meant to create a remedy for the lack of FAPE that 
could not be accessed by families without the financial resources to pay 
tuition of thousands of dollars and wait for reimbursement.  The IDEA’s 
core principle is a guarantee of FAPE to all eligible children.103  
Throughout the IDEA, Congress has expressed a clear intent to support and 
protect the interests of families without financial resources.104  As the Court 
reiterated in Winkelman ex rel. Winkleman v. Parma City School District,105 
parents’ rights under the IDEA must be interpreted so as to ensure that 
some children are not excluded from its protections and benefits: “[w]e find 
nothing in the statute to indicate that when Congress required States to 
provide adequate instruction to a child ‘at no cost to parent,’ it intended 
that only some parents would be able to enforce that mandate.” 106 
Even in a case where hearing officers or judges are open to ordering 
prospective tuition, parents who cannot pay tuition in advance face huge 
logistical challenges.  A parent without financial resources must first find a 
private school willing to consider accepting the child without a substantial 
deposit or tuition in advance.  Even if fortunate enough to find a school 
willing to provisionally accept the child, in order for a parent to become 
eligible for tuition payment in some jurisdictions, that parent will likely 
have to incur a substantial debt to the school.  Due to the fact that the 
administrative process is long, and schools are not likely to want to take 
such a huge financial risk, this is not a realistic option for most parents. 
                                                          
 103. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2006); Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 
510 U.S. 7, 13 (1993) (“[The] IDEA was intended to ensure that children with 
disabilities receive an education that is both appropriate and free.”); Sch. Comm. of 
Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 367 (1985) (“Congress stated the purpose 
of the Act in these words: ‘to assure that all handicapped children have available to 
them . . . [and] free appropriate public education . . . .’”). 
 104. See, e.g., § 1431(a)(5) (“Congress finds that there is an urgent and substantial 
need . . . to enhance the capacity of State and local agencies and service providers to 
identify, evaluate, and meet the needs of all children, particularly minority, low-
income, inner city, and rural children, and infants and toddlers in foster care.”); id. § 
1437(b)(7) (any State “shall provide satisfactory assurance that policies and procedures 
have been adopted to ensure meaningful involvement of underserved groups, including 
minority, low-income, homeless, and rural families and children with disabilities who 
are wards of the State . . . .”); id. § 1453(b)(8) (states must “describe the steps the State 
education agency will take to ensure that poor and minority children are not taught at 
higher rates by teachers who are not highly qualified . . .”); id. § 1471(a)(2)(iii) (grants 
may be awarded to parent organizations “the parent and professional members of which 
are broadly representative of the population to be served, including low-income parents 
. . .”); id. § 1472(a)(1) (“The Secretary may award grants to, and enter into contracts 
and cooperative agreements with, local parent organizations to support community 
parent resource centers that will help ensure that underserved parents of children with 
disabilities . . . have the training and information the parents need . . . .”); id. § 
1481(d)(3)(C) (providing that in awarding grants and contracts the Secretary may give 
priority to “projects that address the needs of . . . children from low income families”). 
 105. 550 U.S. 516 (2007). 
 106. Id. at 533. 
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A family that locates a private school that might consider a child if 
funding were awarded would be in a similarly disadvantaged position.  
Such a school would be difficult to find, since that school would have to 
hold open a seat until funding is resolved.  Although hearings are supposed 
to conclude in seventy-five days, personal experience suggests that, as the 
result of continuances, they rarely do.  A parent who found a school willing 
to accept a disabled child if funding were awarded would never be able to 
obtain a timely remedy of funding by using the administrative process. 
In addition, courts and hearing officers often want to see that a child 
made progress in the private placement before finding that placement is 
appropriate.  Moreover, it is particularly difficult to establish that a public 
placement does not offer FAPE without access to timely independent 
evaluations or outside experts to support the parent’s claim. 
C.  Independent Educational Evaluations 
Under the IDEA, school districts are responsible for conducting 
evaluations of children suspected of having disabilities.  The statute 
mandates that a “full and individual” evaluation be conducted and children 
assessed in all areas related to the suspected disability.107 The evaluation 
must use “a variety of assessment tools and strategies to gather relevant 
functional, developmental, and academic information.”108 Such tools and 
strategies must provide relevant information that directly assists persons in 
determining that the educational needs of the child are provided.109 Tests 
must be “selected and administered so as not to be discriminatory on a 
racial or cultural basis” and the district is to use “technically sound 
instruments that may assess the relative contribution of cognitive and 
behavioral factors, in addition to physical or developmental factors.”110 
Under the IDEA, parents have the right to an independent educational 
evaluation (IEE) at public expense when they disagree with an evaluation 
conducted by the school district.111  An IEE is an evaluation or assessment 
conducted by professionals who do not work for the district and who are 
supposed to be “independent.”  The assessment is an important element of 
due process, as it enables parents to obtain evaluative information as well 
as suggestions on instructional strategies from professionals who are not 
beholden to districts or under pressure to minimize education budgets. 
If a parent requests an IEE, the district must, without unnecessary 
                                                          
 107. § 1414(a)(1)(A), (b)(3)(B); see also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit 8, § 
200.4(b)(6)(vii). 
 108. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b); 34 C.F.R. § 300.304 (2011). 
 109. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(3)(C). 
 110. § 1414(b)(2)(C), (b)(3)(A)(i). 
 111. § 1415(b)(1); 34 C.F.R. § 300.502. 
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delay,112 ensure that the IEE is provided or file an administrative due 
process hearing to show that either its own evaluation is appropriate or the 
evaluation obtained by the parent as an IEE does not meet the legitimate 
criteria for evaluations set forth by the school district.113  The statute itself 
prescribes only one other way for an IEE to be conducted: a hearing officer 
can order evaluations as part of a hearing—at the district’s expense.  More 
than two decades ago, the Department of Education’s Office of Special 
Education Programs (OSEP) issued an opinion letter suggesting that a 
parent who does not have money to pay for an IEE may first file a hearing 
before the evaluation is done if funding is needed.114  However, it is clear 
that the statute was written with the wealthy parent in mind. 
Despite the fact that the IEE is supposed to be an important due process 
right, it is very difficult for a parent without financial resources to exercise 
this right.  A parent with greater financial resources can pay for the 
evaluation and present it at hearing to rebut the district’s claims that its own 
testing was adequate.  Often times, that parent can afford to have the 
professional available to testify at the hearing.  In fact, that parent can first 
retain an independent specialist to first review the district’s assessments 
and then determine whether any further testing is needed. 
A parent who cannot afford to pay for an expert and who does not 
already have an independent evaluation to establish the invalidity of the 
district’s evaluation has a difficult hurdle to climb in terms of proof, even 
with legal representation.  A parent needs an IEE to prove his or her child’s 
need for an IEE.  Further, even though OSEP has opined that a parent may 
file a hearing to obtain funding for an IEE, the hearing officer may allow 
the district to conduct another assessment as a remedy before ordering an 
IEE, although this right does not appear in the law.115 
In some cases in which a parent is seeking prospective payment for an 
IEE, the hearing officer has allowed the district to defend its own 
evaluation, even if the district delayed or never responded to the parent’s 
request.  In contrast, in cases where a district has delayed and a parent has 
                                                          
 112.  One district court, applying the standard set out in 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b), 
determined that the school district unnecessarily delayed the IEE when it waited three 
weeks before asking the student to reiterate the request and then waited another eight 
weeks to file a due process complaint to prove the appropriateness of its “in house” 
evaluation, without any explanation.  See Pajaro Valley Unified Sch. Dist. v. J.S., No. 
C 06-0380 PVT, 2006 WL 3734289, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2006). 
 113. 34 C.F.R. § 300.502. 
 114. Letter from Robert A. Davila, Assistant Secretary, Office of Special Educ. & 
Rehabilitative Servs., to Honorable Robert F. Smith, Member, U.S. House of 
Representatives (June 28, 1990) (“It should be noted that a parent may request a 
hearing . . . or file a complaint with the State educational agency before the IEE is 
performed if the parent believes that denial of advance funding for the IEE would deny 
the parent a publicly-funded IEE.”). 
 115. Id. 
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already obtained an IEE, that parent is typically reimbursed. 
Additionally, parents without means have to overcome the fact that the 
IDEA does not expressly allow a parent to obtain an IEE if the district fails 
to evaluate—or timely evaluate—or fails to conduct a particular assessment 
as part of the overall evaluation.  Even though at least one court has ruled 
that a parent is entitled to an IEE if a district fails to evaluate,116 the statute 
does not expressly allow for that.  Once a parent files a hearing asking for 
an IEE based on an incomplete evaluation, the hearing officer may rule that 
the parent is not entitled to the assessment because the district has failed to 
conduct one first.  Thus, there is no clear statutory remedy when and if a 
district fails to evaluate a child or fails to conduct all of the assessments 
necessary.  The inability for parents without means to obtain timely IEEs 
also affects their ability to request other remedies, such as private school 
funding, a change in IEP program or placement, and compensatory 
education. 
D.  Compensatory Education 
Although the remedy of compensatory education is not specified in the 
IDEA, it has evolved from the general equitable jurisdiction of courts and 
hearing officers.  Compensatory education is, generally, the right to ask for 
make-up special education or general education instruction and related 
services when a student has been denied a FAPE.  Yet, the remedy varies 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.117  In terms of crafting a compensatory 
education award, some courts hold that for each hour a student is denied 
FAPE, the student is entitled to one hour of compensatory education.118  
                                                          
 116. See Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. v. D.L., 548 F. Supp. 2d 815, 823 (C.D. 
Cal. 2008) (recognizing that hearing officer can use equitable powers to order an IEE 
even where district fails to evaluate a child). 
 117. See Reid ex rel. Reid v. District of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 527 (D.C. Cir. 
2005) (“When a school district deprives a disabled child of [FAPE] in violation of the 
[IDEA], a court fashioning ‘appropriate’ relief, may order compensatory education, i.e., 
replacement of educational services child should have received in the first place.”); Bd. 
of Educ. of Oak Park v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 79 F.3d 654, 660 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting 
that relief in the form of reimbursement for out-of-pocket educational expenses, or 
“compensatory education” as it is formally called, is “indeed exceptional and nowhere 
expressly authorized by the statute”); Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist., 31 
F.3d 1489, 1496-97 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that while compensatory education services 
can be awarded as appropriate equitable relief, courts have discretion on how to craft 
the relief, and “[t]here is no obligation to provide a day-for-day compensation for time 
missed”); Sandhya Gopal, Compensatory Education and the IDEA, 35 SCH. L. BULL. 
14 (2004) (discussing the evolution of compensatory education as a proper remedy by 
tracking court decisions such as G. v. Fort Bragg Dependent Schs., 343 F.3d 295 (4th 
Cir. 2003)). 
 118. See, e.g., M.C. v. Cent. Reg’l Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 391-92, 396-97 (3d Cir. 
1996) (“[A] disabled child is entitled to compensatory education for a period equal to 
the period of deprivation, [but] excluding . . . the time reasonably required for the 
school district to rectify the problem.”); Westendorp v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 273, 35 F. 
Supp. 2d 1134, 1138 (D. Minn. 1998) (“[W]here [plaintiff] was denied his IDEA rights 
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Other courts have held that there is no requirement to provide an hour-for-
hour calculation, and require a flexible, individualized analysis of 
compensation based upon the child’s individual needs.119  Some courts 
have also awarded compensatory education to students who are over 
twenty-one and past the age of eligibility for FAPE.120 
Children from families without financial resources are the most likely to 
require compensatory education, because their parents cannot afford private 
school tuition, tutoring, and other services if a district is not providing 
FAPE.  Yet, it is often difficult for these parents to present sufficient 
evidence of the need for compensatory education, owing to some of the 
same difficulties discussed above in accessing independent experts and 
private providers who can testify at a hearing. Some courts have ruled that 
parents can never receive any type of prospective payments for 
compensatory education. This ruling effectively eliminates compensatory 
education as an effective remedy for many children.121 
Another problem faced by parents without resources is that a hearing 
officer who does not have expert reports upon which to rely may, more 
often than not, simply remand the consideration of a compensatory remedy 
back to the very school district that denied the child a FAPE. However, 
some courts have ruled that remanding the creation of a compensatory 
remedy back to a school district violates parents’ rights to an independent 
fact-finder and impartial hearing.122 
Most parents do not know that compensatory education exists as a 
remedy. Although a district is legally mandated to provide parents with a 
                                                          
for six academic years, the court will presume that he is entitled to six academic years 
of compensatory relief.”). 
 119. See, e.g., Reid, 401 F.3d at 516 (holding that a flexible approach, instead of 
hour-for-hour method for calculating compensatory education, is more appropriate for 
remedying past deprivations); G ex rel. RG v. Fort Bragg Dependent Schs., 343 F.3d 
295 (4th Cir. 2003) (“Compensatory education involves discretionary, prospective, 
injunctive relief crafted by a court to remedy what might be termed an educational 
deficit created by an educational agency’s failure over a given period of time to provide 
a FAPE to a student.”); Parents of Student W., 31 F.3d at 1497 (“There is no obligation 
to provide a day-for-day compensation for time missed. Appropriate relief is relief 
designed to ensure that the student is appropriately educated within the meaning of the 
IDEA.”). 
 120. See Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. ex rel. M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 249 (3d Cir. 
1999) (“An award of compensatory education allows a disabled student to continue 
beyond age twenty-one in order to make up for earlier deprivation of a [FAPE].”); Mrs. 
C. ex rel. J.C. v. Wheaton, 916 F.2d 69, 75 (2d Cir. 1990) (acknowledging that in order 
for court to award compensatory education to a student over age twenty-one, there must 
have been a “gross” violation of the IDEA). 
 121. See Diaz-Fonseca v. Puerto Rico, 451 F.3d 13, 35, 39 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 122. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Fayette v. L.M. ex rel. T.D. 478 F.3d 307, 317-18 (6th 
Cir. 2007) (providing that IEP teams cannot be in charge of remedy on remand because 
it violates principles of impartial hearings); Reid, 401 F.3d at 516 (providing IEP teams 
cannot determine remedy as it violates finality principles of IDEA’s due process 
procedures). 
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copy of the IDEA’s due process rights and safeguards,123 compensatory 
education is not a remedy that is listed in the statute and is not required to 
be included in the safeguards.  Thus, parents without resources who do not 
have access to legal counsel will never know that they have this remedy 
unless they discover it by chance. 
E.  The IDEA Does Not Contain Emergency Procedures to Handle Any 
Issue Other Than Disciplinary Issues for Suspended Children 
Once a parent files a hearing under the IDEA, a district has thirty days to 
try to settle the hearing through a “resolution meeting” before it can 
commence.  After thirty days, the hearing officer has another forty-five 
days during which to issue a decision.124  In some states, there is a second 
level of administrative review125 and a decision may not be issued for 
months or even years, despite the statutory timeframes.126  Given the 
number of adjournments and scheduling conflicts, hearings are rarely, if 
ever, decided within the mandatory periods. 
Although courts regularly rule that the failure to receive special or 
regular education constitutes irreparable harm, and thus education delayed 
is education denied,127 the IDEA hearing process does not contain any 
emergency mechanism for due process, except in those situations where 
children are subject to suspensions for their behavior.128  This is a 
significant oversight in the due process system.129 
                                                          
 123. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d)(1)(A), (d)(2) (2006). 
 124. 34 C.F.R. § 300.532(b)(2)(ii) (2011). 
 125. See also Perry A. Zirkel & Gina Scala, Due Process Hearing Systems Under 
the IDEA: A State-by-State Survey, 21 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 3 (2011), available at 
http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/pdf/Due%20Process%20Hearing%20Systems.pd
f.  States with a two-tiered system include Colorado, Kansas, Kentucky, Nevada, New 
York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, and South Carolina.  Id. at 5 tbl.1. 
 126. KEVIN L. LANIGAN ET AL., Nasty, Brutish . . . and Often Not Very Short: The 
Attorney Perspective on Due Process, in RETHINKING SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR A NEW 
CENTURY 213, 219 (Chester E. Finn, Jr. et al. eds., 2001). 
 127. See, e.g., Cosgrove ex rel. Cosgrove v. Bd. of Educ., 175 F. Supp. 2d 375, 392-
94 (N.D.N.Y. 2001);  Borough of Palmyra, Bd. of Educ. v. F.C. ex rel. R.C., 2 F. Supp. 
2d 637, 645 (D.N.J. 1998) (holding that the loss of an appropriate education “would 
constitute irreparable harm”); A.T. & I.T. ex rel. Z.T. v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t., No. 
98-CV-4166 (JG), 1998 WL 765371, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 1998); J.B. v. Killingly 
Bd. of Educ., 990 F. Supp. 57, 72 (D. Conn. 1997);  Blazejewski ex rel. Blazejewski v. 
Bd. of Educ., 560 F. Supp. 701, 703 (W.D.N.Y. 1983); Cox v. Brown, 498 F. Supp. 
823, 828-829 (D.D.C. 1980). 
 128. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(B). 
 129. In fact, in some states it appears that administrative hearing officers believe 
they have jurisdiction to issue interim orders.  See, e.g., E. Penn. Sch. Dist., 9743-08-
09-LS; 10106-08-09-LS; 00283-09-10-LS, 110 LRP 26544 (Penn. SEA Jan. 7, 2010); 
Burlington Pub. Schs., SEA-01-4513, 35 IDELR 80 (Mass. SEA June 14, 2001); East 
Troy Cmty. Sch. Dist., SEA-95-001-A, 24 IDELR 794 (Wis. SEA July 22, 1996); 
Chambers Cnty. Bd. of Educ., SEA-[no case number], 508 IDELR 34 (Ala. SEA 
February 27, 1987).  In contrast, hearing officers in other jurisdictions assert no 
authority to issue an interim order other than one for a stay put order.  Application of a 
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Since the IDEA presumes district compliance with its procedures and 
does not contemplate that children will be out of school, not timely 
assessed, or not receiving agreed-upon services, perhaps Congress did not 
see a need to adopt emergency hearing procedures for families that cannot 
afford private school tuition.  Yet, since these situations are all too realistic, 
the failure of the IDEA to ensure that parents of children who have not 
committed a disciplinary infraction may seek emergency relief without 
being forced into an expensive—and generally out of reach—court action, 
is a significant gap in the procedures. 
F.  The IDEA Should Contain a Uniform Statute of Limitations Period 
In 2004, the IDEA was amended to require a party who files a due 
process complaint to do so within two years of when the party knew or 
should have known of the alleged violation, or within such timeframe as a 
state allows.130  At this time, two tolling provisions have been adopted in 
the “Exceptions to the Timeline” provision, which reads, in relevant part: 
The timeline shall not apply to a parent if the parent was prevented from 
requesting the hearing due to—(i) specific misrepresentations by the 
local educational agency that it had resolved the problem forming the 
basis of the complaint; or (ii) the local educational agency withholding 
of information from the parent that was required under this part to be 
provided to the parent under this part.131 
Most of the IDEA’s rights are considered to be a “floor”; states may 
adopt greater rights for parents but may not reduce parent rights below 
those afforded by the IDEA.132  Yet, for this critically important aspect of 
due process, the IDEA allows states to shorten the limitations period.133  As 
a result, some states have elected to significantly reduce the statute of 
limitations down to one year or less.134  It is not equitable for parents’ 
ability to lodge complaints under a federal statute to have different rights 
depending on the whims of the state legislatures, particularly when states 
                                                          
Student with a Disability, Appeal No. 10-083, at *1 (N.Y. SEA 2010), available at 
http://www.sro.nysed.gov/decisionindex/2010/10-083.pdf. 
 130. See § 1415(b)(6)(B), (f)(3)(C) (emphasis added). Comments to the IDEA 
regulations note specifically that “hearing officers will have to make determinations, on 
a case-by case basis, of factors affecting whether the parent ‘knew or should have 
known’ about the action that is the basis of the complaint.”  Assistance to States for the 
Education of Children with Disabilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 46,706 (Aug. 14, 2006). 
 131. See § 1415(f)(3)(D). 
 132. § 1407(a). 
 133. § 1415(f)(3)(c); see also Lynn M. Daggett et al., For Whom the School Bell 
Tolls But Not the Statute of Limitations: Minors and the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 717 (2005) (discussing the ways in which 
courts have grappled with circumstances where more than one statute of limitation may 
apply). 
 134. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-109.6(g) (2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 115.80 
(West 2011). 
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have significant financial interest in limiting parents’ abilities to redress 
violations.  Shortened limitations periods protect districts and states that 
fail to offer FAPE, and provide a way for districts to receive and maintain 
IDEA funding with little risk of parent challenge.  Thus, districts can count 
children as receiving special education services for purposes of receiving 
money and there is little, if any, check on whether those services are 
actually being provided. 
The fact that the IDEA does not require parents to be notified that they 
have a remedy of compensatory education renders the application of the 
two year—or in some cases even shorter—limitations period for 
compensatory education cases particularly egregious. 
Further, the IDEA does not contain a specific tolling provision that 
would enable children to assert their rights at the age of majority, whereas 
most limitations periods adopted at the state level do allow for tolling for 
this reason.  Lack of tolling for children who reach the age of majority 
effectively strips away the rights of children who were subject to systemic 
and long-term denials of FAPE and had parents who were not able or 
willing to assert their rights. 
G.   Notice and Safeguards Provisions Do Not Adequately Protect the 
Rights of Parents and Students Without Access to Lawyers and Advocates 
The IDEA requires that districts and public agencies distribute very 
specific notices to parents as part of the special education process.  Prior 
Written Notice must be provided whenever the district “refuses to initiate 
or change, the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the 
child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to the 
child.”135  Prior Written Notice must be “written in an easily 
understandable manner,” defined as “understandable to the general 
public.”136  In the case of evaluations, the “Prior Written Notice” must 
                                                          
 135. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3)(B). Prior Written Notice must contain, at a minimum:  
(a) a description of the action proposed or refused by the agency; (b) an 
explanation of why the agency proposes or refuses to take the action and a 
description of each evaluation procedure, assessment, record, or report the 
agency used as a basis for the proposed or refused action; (c) a statement that 
the parents of a child with a disability have protection under the procedural 
safeguards of this part and, if this notice is not an initial referral for evaluation, 
the means by which a copy of a description of the procedural safeguards can be 
obtained; (d) sources for parents to contact to obtain. assistance in 
understanding the provisions of 20 U.S.C. § 1415; (e) a description of other 
options considered by the IEP Team and the reason why those options were 
rejected; and (f) a description of the factors that are relevant to the agency’s 
proposal or refusal.   
§ 1415(c)(1). 
 136. 34 C.F.R. § 300.503(c) (2011).  Prior Written Notice is “[o]ne of the most 
important rights that parents have under the IDEA.”  Tara J. Parillo, Comment, The 
Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA): Parental Involvement and the Surrogate 
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include “a description of the proposed evaluation or reevaluation and the 
uses to be made of the information.”137 
Districts must also distribute a document detailing the IDEA’s 
procedural safeguards to parents that contains a full explanation of the 
procedural safeguards, available under the statute and regulation relating to 
the due process rights.138  Similar to Prior Written Notice, the safeguards 
must be “written in an easily understandable manner,” meaning 
“understandable to the general public.”139 
Although these protections theoretically appear significant, in practice 
they do not serve to protect and inform the rights of families and young 
people without financial resources.140  Further, enforcement is limited.  
Research has found that districts rarely comply with the requirement to 
ensure that the safeguards issued are in easy-to-read language accessible to 
parents who have not attended college.141 
1.  The IDEA’s Information Access Provisions Should be Strengthened 
The IDEA requires that school districts ensure that the information in the 
notices and safeguards is accessible to parents with limited literacy and 
those who may have other communication deficits.142  The 2004 
amendments even authorize the Secretary of Education to prescribe and 
widely disseminate a model notice of safeguards.143  However, there are 
several major gaps with respect to these statutory provisions that make 
these notice and safeguard provisions virtually meaningless for families 
that are not highly educated or cannot afford to hire a lawyer for advice.144 
                                                          
Appointment Process, 74 OR. L. REV. 1339, 1342 (1995). 
 137. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c)(1)(A). 
 138. § 1415(d); 34 C.F.R. § 300.504(a). 
 139. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.504, 300.503(c). 
 140. Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Aligning or Maligning? Getting Inside a New IDEA, 
Getting Behind No Child Left Behind and Getting Outside of It All, 15 HASTINGS 
WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 11-12 (2004) [hereinafter Rosenbaum, Aligning or Maligning?] 
(“Despite all attempts at promoting self-advocacy, the reality is that many individuals 
will require more intensive support . . . .  Even the much-vaunted technical assistance 
parent/student advocates dispense can prove to be ineffectual if the client is unable to 
translate the advice and coaching into effective advocacy [at the IEP table].”). 
 141. Julie L. Fitzgerald and Marley W. Watkins, Parents’ Rights in Special 
Education: The Readability of Procedural Safeguards, 72 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 497, 
498 (2006). 
 142. Id. at 507. 
 143. 20 U.S.C. § 1417(e)(3). 
 144. This is a vintage grievance.  See, e.g., NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, 
IMPROVING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION 
ACT: MAKING SCHOOLS WORK FOR ALL OF AMERICA’S CHILDREN (1995), available at 
http://www.ncd.gov/publications/1995/09051995 (including a parent’s testimony, “I 
was one of those parents who left . . . IEPs like someone who has left a foreign movie 
without the subtitles.  I felt a very small and incidental part of this procedure . . . .”); 
see also Fitzgerald & Watkins, supra note 141, at 506; Carmen Gomez Mandic et al., 
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2.  The IDEA Does Not Ensure Participation of Parents who Have 
Limited English Language or Literacy Skills 
The IDEA does not ensure that parents whose native language is not 
English or who are not literate in the English language can access the 
special education process for their children.  Some areas of the country 
educate significant numbers of students who are English Language 
Learners (ELLs).145  Many parents of ELL students are not proficient in 
understanding, speaking, and reading English.  Research has shown that 
only 13% of Americans are deemed “proficient” when it comes to literacy 
skills.146  Only 71% of American students graduate from high school on 
time and, for certain populations like Latino and African-American 
students, that number drops significantly.147 
While the IDEA requires that notice and safeguards be provided in a 
parent’s native language and made accessible for non-readers, the law does 
not mandate that a child’s educational records and reports are translated 
into a parent’s native language or made accessible to parents who cannot 
read or have other communication deficits.148  Thus, most general 
                                                          
Readability of Special Education Procedural Safeguards, J. SPECIAL EDUC., Mar. 10, 
2010, at *4, available at 
http://sed.sagepub.com/content/early/2010/03/10/0022466910362774.full.pdf (finding 
that 94% of state’s procedural safeguards were written at college or graduate school 
level). 
 145. See, e.g., ROSE M. PAYAN & MICHAEL T. NETTLES, EDUC. TESTING SERV., 
CURRENT STATE OF ENGLISH-LANGUAGE LEARNERS IN THE U.S. K-12 STUDENT 
POPULATION 2 (2009), available at 
http://www.ets.org/Media/Conferences_and_Events/pdf/ELLsympsium/ELL_factsheet.
pdf (finding that in 2004-05, 5.1 million students, 10.5%, of the United States’ student 
population, are ELLs and that six states—Arizona, California, Texas, New York, 
Florida, and Illinois—contain 61% of the ELL population).  Large population states are 
not alone, however, as many states have seen significant growth in their ELL 
population over a similar period.  See, e.g., KATHLEEN FLYNN & JANE HILL, MID-
CONTINENT RESEARCH FOR EDUC. & LEARNING, ENGLISH LANGUAGE LEARNERS: A 
GROWING POPULATION 2-3 (2005), available at 
http://www.mcrel.org/pdf/policybriefs/5052pi_pbenglishlanguagelearners.pdf 
(explaining that, for example, Colorado, Nebraska, and South Dakota saw the number 
of ELL students in their elementary schools grow three-fold between 1990 and 2000). 
 146. National Assessment of Adult Literacy, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, 
http://nces.ed.gov/naal/kf_demographics.asp (last visited June 17, 2011). 
 147. See ALLIANCE FOR EXCELLENT EDUC., FACT SHEET: HIGH SCHOOL DROPOUTS 
IN AMERICA 1 (2009), available at 
http://www.all4ed.org/files/GraduationRates_FactSheet.pdf (“[B]arely half of African 
American and Hispanic students earn diplomas with their peers [and i]n many states the 
difference between white and minority graduation rates [is as much] as 40 or 50 
percentage points.”); see also JAY P. GREENE, MANHATTAN INST. FOR POLICY 
RESEARCH, HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATION RATES IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (rev. 2002), 
http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/cr_baeo.pdf (documenting the substantial 
difference between African American and Hispanic graduation rates as compared to 
their regional and school district peers). 
 148. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(4), (d)(2) (requiring that notices of placement decisions 
and procedural safeguards be provided in parents’ native language unless “clearly . . . 
not feasible”); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.345(e) (requiring interpreter at IEP meetings).  
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education records, evaluations, and IEPs are not translated for parents or 
made accessible or explained to parents who cannot read English.  Those 
families are effectively excluded from having meaningful involvement in 
the special education process for their children.149 
3. The IDEA Does Not Mandate a Written Explanation of the Special 
Education Process 
The IDEA does not require districts to provide written information to 
parents that explains the special education process in plain language.  Thus, 
parents receive complicated notices and descriptions of procedural and due 
process rights without having a basic understanding of how the underlying 
special education system functions. Therefore, in practice families without 
attorneys or access to advocates, who can explain the special education 
process, cannot meaningfully invoke due process rights because they are 
generally not able to identify that something has gone wrong in the special 
education process.  According to one commentary, “To be successful, . . . 
parents must be knowledgeable about their child and his disability.  They 
must also be able to understand the proceedings of the IEP meetings, voice 
disagreement and seek clarification and be willing to utilize the [conflict 
resolution] processes.  Successful decision-making and implementation 
require skills and knowledge beyond the reach of many.”150 
4. The IDEA Should Require Individualized Notices When Students Leave 
School Without a Diploma 
One of the most significant gaps in the IDEA’s due process system is 
that the statute fails to take account of the fact that so many children leave 
school without a diploma because of inadequate special education services.  
Although states have not yet been able to develop a uniform way of 
reporting graduates with IEPs, a review of student exit data published by 
the Department of Education demonstrates that the majority of students 
                                                          
Even in California, with its longstanding experience in providing interpretation and 
translation for monolingual Spanish-speaking parents, the theory may be better than the 
reality; see, e.g., Pajaro Valley Unified Sch. Dist. v. J.S., No. C 06-0380 PVT, 2006 
WL 3734289, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2006) (stating that the school district gave 
Spanish-speaking parent only English language version of assessment). 
 149. See, e.g., Patricia A. Massey & Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Disability Matters: 
Toward a Law School Model for Serving Youth with Special Education Needs, 
CLINICAL L. REV. Spring 2005, at 271, 281-82 (2005) (discussing advocacy barriers 
faced by parents who speak limited English, and are low-income and lacking formal 
education). 
 150. See id. at 279-80 (2005) (internal citations omitted) (“Other characteristics of 
parents that may interfere with their ability to advocate for FAPE for their children 
include: fear of retaliation against the student; a desire to maintain good relations with 
the school; cultural norms that place educators in positions of unquestioned authority; 
feelings of shame about having a child with a disability; and a sense of 
powerlessness.”). 
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with IEPs leave school without a diploma.151  Across the United States, 
only 39% of students with disabilities ages sixteen to twenty-one who 
exited the special education system earn a regular diploma.152  The 
outcomes are far worse for certain classifications of children, as well as in 
some states and cities throughout the country.153  For example, only 24% of 
students classified as “emotionally disturbed” who exited special education 
earned a regular diploma.154  Black students are twice as likely as white 
students to be labeled emotionally disturbed.155  Dropout rates are deemed 
twice as high for special education students than for general education 
students.156  A significant number of organizations have recognized 
students with disabilities drop out of school; national advocacy, policy, and 
research groups focus heavily on improving graduation rates and transition 
outcomes for children with disabilities.157 
Despite this, the IDEA only recognizes that graduation with a regular 
                                                          
 151. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), DATA ACCOUNTABILITY 
CTR., https://www.ideadata.org/PartBExiting.asp (last visited June 17, 2011). 
 152. See id.  (requiring states to collect data on exiting students ages fourteen to 
twenty-one) (percentage calculated by authors).  The exit categories are: (1) Graduated 
with regular high school diploma, (2) Received a certificate, (3) Reached maximum 
age, (4) Transferred to regular education, (5) Died, (6) Moved,  Known to be 
continuing, (7) Dropped out, (8) Total Exited Special Education.  Id. (follow link 
“2009-10 (csv)”).  There has been significant controversy over the “Moved, Known to 
be continuing” category, as this figure arguably masks students who should more 
properly be considered dropouts and/or “moved to juvenile and adult detention, jails 
and prisons.”  See id.  For purposes of this Article, those students were kept in the pool.  
To obtain the 39% figure, exiting students ages fourteen and fifteen, who are too young 
to graduate, were eliminated from the data.  The 39% figure was then obtained by 
subtracting from the total number of students who exited special education by those 
who returned to general education or died and then dividing that figure by the students 
who earned regular diplomas.  See id.  
153. See  Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), supra note 151 (noting 
that in New York City, for example, 50% of all of the students who receive special 
education receive services in special education classes and yet, according to the City’s 
statistics, the graduation rate for children in special education classes in the city is only 
4.4%).  See generally ARISE COAL., EDUCATE! INCLUDE! RESPECT! A CALL FOR 
SCHOOL SYSTEM REFORM TO IMPROVE THE EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCES OF STUDENTS 
WITH DISABILITIES, (2009), 
http://www.arisecoalition.org/Include!%20%20Educate!%20%20Respect!.pdf. 
 154. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), supra note 151  
(percentage calculated by authors by subtracting from the total number of students who 
exited special education by those who returned to general education or died and then 
dividing that figure by the students who earned regular diplomas). 
 155. 1 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 28TH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONG. ON THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT, 2006 48 
tbl. 1-9 (2006) (noting that black students had a risk ration of being classified as 
emotionally disturbed at 2.24, compared to white students at 0.85). 
 156. See Martha L. Thurlow et al., Students with Disabilities who Drop Out of 
School—Implications for Policy and Practice, NAT’L CTR. ON SECONDARY EDUC. & 
TRANSITION, June 2002, available at 
http://www.ncset.org/publications/printresource.asp?id=425 (citing Blackorby & 
Wagner (citation omitted)). 
 157. See, e.g., id. 
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diploma constitutes a “change of placement” that requires Prior Written 
Notice and triggers the IDEA’s procedural safeguards.158  Further, before a 
student graduates, a district must provide the parent with “a summary of the 
child’s academic achievement and functional performance, which shall 
include recommendations on how to assist child in meeting the child’s 
postsecondary goals.”159 
Yet, despite the fact that so many children leave school without a 
diploma—whether due to a lack of progress, dropping out, being 
discharged or transferred to alternative programs, or ending up 
incarcerated—the IDEA does not provide any specific notices or 
procedural protections for those students or their parents, who are 
presumably in far greater need of specific protections than those students 
who earn diplomas. 
H. Due Process Protections Should be Clarified to Include Truancy Within 
the Scope of Protected Behavior 
As noted above, one of the underlying purposes of the original special 
education statute was to prevent the exclusion of students with disabilities 
from school.160  Section 504 provides a basic level of protection in that a 
student with a disability cannot be subject to any discrimination based upon 
conduct that is a manifestation of his or her disability.161  Early decisions 
under Section 504 and the IDEA held that children who exhibit behavioral 
difficulties must have certain protections in place to ensure they are not 
excluded or punished based upon disability-related behavior.162  Eventually 
the specific substantive and procedural protections for disabled students 
exhibiting behavioral problems in school were written into the IDEA.163  
                                                          
 158. 34 C.F.R. § 300.102 (a)(3)(iii) (2011). 
 159. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(c)(5)(B)(ii) (2006). 
 160. See supra notes 34-36, 39 and accompanying text; Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 
308 (1988). 
 161. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2006) (Section 504 and its regulations provide that 
“[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States, . . . shall, 
solely by reason of his or her disability . . . be subjected to discrimination under any 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .”).    
 162. S-1 ex rel. P-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 350 (5th Cir. 1981)  (holding that 
before disabled students could be expelled from school a “qualified group of 
individuals” must determine “that no relationship existed between [the plaintiffs’] 
handicap and their misconduct,” and that this group must be composed of the same 
experts that determined the child’s placement and handicap under the IDEA); see 
Honig, 484 U.S. at 308 (under both Section 504 and the IDEA, team of experts must 
evaluate child and determine whether behavior was a manifestation of child’s disability 
before disciplinarily changing student’s placement); Doe ex rel. Gonzales v. Maher, 
793 F.2d 1470, 1480 (9th Cir. 1986); Kaelin v. Grubbs, 682 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1982). 
 163. Protecting Students with Disabilities: Frequently Asked Questions About 
Section 504 and the Education of Children with Disabilities, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/504faq.html#interrelationship (last visited 
June 17, 2011) (noting the interrelationship between Section 504 and the IDEA provide 
31
Hyman et al.: How IDEA Fails Families Without Means: Causes and Corrections Fro
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2011
HYMAN 10/13/11 12/8/201112:33:54 PM 
138 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 20:1 
Since the initial inclusion of the disciplinary protections, these protections 
were expanded and strengthened in 1997 and then amended in 2004 to 
afford schools greater leeway in excluding students and making law 
enforcement referrals.164  These provisions have been the subject of much 
controversy.165 
The current version of the IDEA’s disciplinary protections incorporates 
several elements: a Manifestation Determination Review,166 a Functional 
Behavior Assessment,167 a Behavioral Intervention Plan,168 and a guarantee 
of FAPE for children even when they are subject to suspension for more 
than ten days in any school year.169  Certain guidelines were also 
established for services for students in longer-term removals who commit 
more serious disciplinary infractions.170 
In addition to the due process provisions of 20 U.S.C. § 1415, the IDEA 
requires all IEP teams to include “positive behavioral supports” using 
research based methods for children whose behavior interferes with their 
own learning or the education of other children.171  Even with the 
provisions in the statute, students with disabilities are subject to much 
higher rates of student suspensions, with significant over-representation of 
African-American and Latino males being suspended in many 
                                                          
students with a network of protections that are intended to preserve the disabled 
student’s right and ability to FAPE: “Section 504 prohibits discrimination on the basis 
of disability in programs or activities that receive Federal financial assistance from the 
U.S. Department of Education. Title II [of the ADA] prohibits discrimination on the 
basis of disability by state and local governments. . . . [The IDEA is] a statute which 
funds special education programs.  Each state educational agency is responsible for 
administering IDEA within the state and distributing the funds for special education 
programs. IDEA is a grant statute and attaches many specific conditions to the receipt 
of Federal IDEA funds. Section 504 and the ADA are antidiscrimination laws and do 
not provide any type of funding.”).  
 164. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments for 1997, Pub. L. No. 
105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (1997); Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act 
of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (2004). 
 165. For articles prior to the 2004 IDEA reauthorization, see, for example, Philip 
T.K. Daniel, Discipline and the IDEA Reauthorization: The Need to Resolve 
Inconsistencies, 142 EDUC. L. REP. 591 (2000); Anne Proffitt Dupre, A Study in Double 
Standards, Discipline, and the Disabled Student, 75 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2000); Lauren 
Zykorie, Reauthorizing Discipline for the Disabled Student: Will Congress Create a 
Better Balance in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)?, 3 CONN. 
PUB. INT. L.J. 101 (2003).  Since the 2004 IDEA reauthorization, these provisions 
remain controversial.  See, e.g., Randy Chapman, The Discipline Process for Students 
with Disabilities Under the IDEA, COLO. LAW. July 2007, at 63; Perry A. Zirkel, 
Suspensions and Expulsions of Students with Disabilities: The Latest Requirements, 
214 EDUC. L. REP. 445 (2007). 
 166. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(E). 
 167. § 1415(k)(1)(D), (F). 
 168. § 1415(k)(1)(F). 
 169. § 1412(a)(1). 
 170. § 1415(k)(1)(B). 
 171. § 1414(d)(3)(B)(i). 
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jurisdictions.172 
As noted above, approximately 40% of students with IEPs appear to 
leave school without a diploma.173  Further, truancy among special 
education high school students is widespread.174  In many states, children 
who are truant are actually prosecuted in juvenile or family courts and may 
be incarcerated if they fail to attend school regularly after a judicial 
“intervention.”175 
While the IDEA requires significant due process procedures and 
protections from a child who hits another child or curses at a teacher, it 
contains no express protections for truant students.  Many school districts 
and courts do not treat truancy as a “behavior” subject to protection under 
the IDEA.  The treatment of truancy as if it were separate from the concept 
of “behavior that demonstrates a lack of progress” is more often than not a 
manifestation of the child’s disability exacerbated and triggered by 
“warehousing” children in inappropriate educational settings.  This is yet 
another major gap in the statute’s protections.  Vulnerable students who 
end up with attendance difficulties after years of failure and defeat are 
blamed instead of helped.176  While advocates and lawyers can make 
arguments on a child-by-child basis that truancy has to be properly 
addressed by the IEP team, this strategy, standing alone, is insufficient to 
tackle this significant issue. 
By mandating that school districts were responsible for the education of 
students with behavioral difficulties, districts had to develop strategies, 
based on research, to educate students they could no longer exclude based 
on disciplinary infractions.  The same pressure should be brought to bear to 
address truancy; until districts are held fully accountable for those students, 
they will not be forced to develop better programs for failing high school 
age students. 
I. Students’ IDEA Rights Should be Clarified and Strengthened 
The question of whether, and to what extent, children and young people 
have or should have rights in the special education process is important, but 
complex. Thus, a full discussion of these issues is not attempted here.  
However, given the importance of the issues, particularly for students from 
low-income families, children whose parents are not native English 
speakers, children whose parents are sick or unavailable, and children who 
                                                          
 172. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text. 
 173. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
 174. See Dean Hill Rivkin, Truancy Prosecutions of Students and the Right [To] 
Education, 3 DUKE F. FOR L. & SOC. CHANGE (forthcoming 2011). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Garcia v. Bd. of Educ., 520 F.3d 1116, 1120 (10th Cir. 2008). 
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are in the foster care or juvenile and adult education systems, some of the 
overarching issues bear mentioning. 
States may transfer rights from parents to any student who reaches the 
age of majority in that state, except for a child who has been determined to 
be incompetent under state law.177  If a transfer is made, notice must be 
provided to both the student and the parent, all other rights accorded to the 
parents are transferred to the child, and the agency must notify the student 
and the parent of the transfer of rights.178  If a state adopts a transfer of 
rights provision and a student is not able to provide informed consent—
even if the student has not been declared legally “incompetent”—the state 
can adopt procedures by which a parent can be appointed as an educational 
decision-maker.179  No later than one year before a student reaches the age 
of majority, the IEP must include a statement documenting that the student 
has been advised of the fact that rights will transfer when the student 
reaches the age of majority.180  Juxtaposed against the reality faced by most 
older students who receive special education services, these provisions do 
not come close to serving the interests of most students. 
It is a serious flaw in the statutory scheme that the IDEA fails to mandate 
that all students be provided notice of their rights until just prior to, or at 
the age of majority.  This is particularly disturbing in light of the fact that 
so many students age seventeen and over leave school without a diploma. 
Regardless of the federal statute, in almost every state, once students turn 
eighteen they have the right to make their own educational decisions, 
marry, vote, and even join the military.  In many states, youth over fifteen 
are charged as adults if they commit a crime. 
The fact that students in states where rights do not transfer seem to be 
virtually excluded from the process, and are not clearly mandated to 
receive certain notices, are omissions that should be addressed through an 
IDEA amendment.181  This is particularly true since school districts are 
required to appoint a surrogate parent in cases where the parent cannot, or 
will not, participate in the special education process.  Many young people 
simply stop attending high school because their educational needs are not 
being met. Yet, when they are awarded different programs and services that 
meet their needs through a hearing, they will diligently attend and succeed.  
Students who leave school discouraged and disengaged do not know that 
                                                          
 177. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (m)(1) (2006). 
 178. Id. 
 179. § 1415 (m)(2). 
 180. § 1414 (d)(1)(A)(i)(VIII)(cc). 
 181. The Second Circuit ruled years ago that students over the age of eighteen, and 
their parents, are required to have sufficient notices prior to a termination of special 
education services even in a state where rights are not transferred.  Mrs. C. ex rel. J.C. 
v. Wheaton, 916 F.2d 69, 75 (2d Cir. 1990). 
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their parents can take steps to change their educational program and 
placement. 
Further, this provision casts doubt on whether students who are legal 
adults have standing to file for hearings with respect to their own 
educational rights, a concept at odds with the general thrust of all state 
laws.  For states in which rights are transferred, enforcement and oversight 
appear to be significant problems. 
J. Limitations On Attorneys’ Fees And Expert Witness Fees Have 
Effectively Eviscerated the Ability of Families Without Means to Access the 
IDEA Due Process System 
The incentive of attorney-fee shifting was incorporated into the IDEA in 
1986, eight years after the landmark enactment of the Civil Rights 
Attorney’s Fees Award Statute.182  This reversal of the longstanding rule 
that parties’ should bear their own fees in litigation recognized that the 
availability of fees to prevailing parties in civil rights and other cases where 
private parties were enforcing public mandates was essential to attract 
lawyers to this genre of litigation, where parties typically could not afford 
the costs and fees of often protracted litigation, and for the deterrent— 
compliance-generating—effects that fee-shifting should have on 
government bodies.  The shifting of expert witness fees to losing school 
systems was also an indispensable component of ensuring access to the due 
process hearing system and beyond. 
Lawyers in IDEA cases play crucial roles in understanding the often 
obscure requirements in the IDEA and, perhaps most importantly, knowing 
what remedies are available through the courts. As noted above, parents 
with lawyers prevail at higher rates than those without.183  The necessity of 
expert testimony in most IDEA cases also cannot be disputed.  Without 
skilled experts to counter the expertise enjoyed by school systems, parents 
are at a distinct disadvantage. 
Thus, the erosion of the availability of statutory fees under the civil 
rights laws and the IDEA has been decried by commentators who view this 
trend as a stark display of hostility by the United States Supreme Court and 
lower courts to the assertion of progressive statutory and constitutional 
claims in the federal courts.184  The elimination of the so-called catalyst 
                                                          
 182. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (i)(3)(B), with 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (allowing the 
court to grant reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of costs to the prevailing party who is 
the parent of a disabled child in the former, but also allowing the court to grant fees to a 
successful local or state educational agency under severely limited circumstances). 
 183. See ARCHER, supra note 27, at 7. 
 184. See, e.g., Catherine R. Albiston, & Laura Beth Nielson, The Procedural Attack 
on Civil Rights: The Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the Private Attorney 
General, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1087, 1091 (2007); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Mandatory Pro 
Bono and Private Attorneys General, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1459 (2007). 
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theory by the Supreme Court, in Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. 
West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources185—a non-IDEA 
case—was a significant reversal for litigants seeking access to counsel 
under fee-shifting statutes.  By holding that settlements must have the 
“imprimatur” of the court,186 the strategy of government defendants who 
decide after extensive legal work is performed on a case to offer a decent 
settlement on the merits of the case—without attorney’s fees—and insist 
that the settlement not be presented to the court for signing, has created an 
exquisite conflict for lawyers representing un-rich clients. These clients 
will likely be strongly inclined to accept the deal, leaving the lawyer 
without an avenue for filing for fees. The chilling effect of this strategy on 
access to counsel is evident. 
Another recent attorney’s fees case decided by the Supreme Court, 
Astrue v. Ratliff,187 although decided under the Equal Access to Justice 
Act,188 potentially undercuts the ability of impecunious clients to obtain 
counsel.  In Astrue, the Court interpreted the prevailing party language of 
the Equal Access to Justice Act to hold that an award of attorney’s fees was 
payable to the plaintiff, not to the attorney.189  This subjected the fee to the 
government’s administrative offset program for a pre-existing debt, leaving 
the attorney with either no fee or a vastly reduced one.190  It is too early to 
gauge whether the application of Astrue in IDEA cases will have a serious 
adverse effect. 
A final restriction on meaningful access for families of limited means 
occurred in Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. 
Murphy,191 where the Supreme Court held that parties who prevailed in 
IDEA due process hearings could not recover as part of “costs” outlays for 
expert witnesses.192  The practical consequences of this decision are limited 
because many families with even modest resources cannot afford the 
upfront costs of expert assistance, which can easily run into the thousands 
of dollars. 
Ironically, the elimination of expert witness fees under the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Murphy did little to impact families without financial 
resources, since they could not afford to pay expert witness fees to begin 
with and few experts are willing to work on a contingency fee basis.  This 
                                                          
 185. 532 U.S. 598, 610 (2001). 
 186. Id. at 610. 
 187. 130 S. Ct. 2524 (2010). 
 188. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (d)(1)(A) (2006); see also 130 S. Ct. at 2530 (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring). 
 189. 130 S. Ct. at 2528-29. 
 190. Id. at 2532-33. 
 191. 548 U.S. 291 (2006). 
 192. Id. at 304. 
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is particularly true in areas in which qualified and knowledgeable experts 
are in high demand and have waiting lists even for paying clients.  
Similarly, the Court’s ruling in Winkelman, establishing that parents can 
represent their children on a pro se basis in court,193 is not going to assist 
the majority of families who do not have a basic understanding of their 
IDEA rights. 
K.  The Supreme Court’s Decision to Place the Burden of Proof on Parents 
Harms All Children 
In 2005, the Supreme Court decided Schaffer v. Weast,194 in which the 
Court held that “the burden of proof in an administrative hearing 
challenging an IEP is properly placed upon the party seeking relief.”195  
The Court in Schaffer noted that the “burden of proof” has historically 
encompassed both the “burden of persuasion”—the party who loses if the 
evidence is in “equipoise,”—and the “burden of production,”—the party 
required to come forward with evidence.196  The Schaffer Court restricted 
its ruling to a determination only on the burden of persuasion, as it was 
defined in that case; yet, the decision has generally been interpreted to be 
more far-reaching and to require parents to meet both burdens.197  The 
Schaffer decision prompted numerous articles taking a variety of positions 
concerning both the Court’s decision and the question of the proper 
allocation of burden of proof.198 
                                                          
 193. Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 535 
(2007) (finding that parents have a basis for representing their children in court due to 
parental interest in the education of children). 
 194. 546 U.S. 49 (2005). 
 195. Id. at 56. 
 196. Id. 
 197. See id. at 65.  Read closely, the decision in Schaffer makes clear that the Court 
contemplated that, when a district seeks to change an IEP, it would be the district that 
files the hearing.  See id.  However, that finding suggests the Court may have 
interpreted the IDEA to require a district to file a hearing when it proposes a change in 
an IEP.  Id. This is not a generally accepted principle.  Typically, districts may change 
an IEP or placement unless a parent files for due process. 
 198. See, e.g., Lara Gelbwasser Freed, Cooperative Federalism Post-Schaffer: The 
Burden Of Proof And Preemption In Special Education, 2009 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 103 
(2009); Anne E. Johnson, Evening The Playing Field: Tailoring The Allocation Of The 
Burden Of Proof At Idea Due Process Hearings To Balance Children’s Rights And 
Schools’ Needs, 46 B.C. L. REV. 591 (2005); Joanne Karger, A New Perspective On 
Schaffer v. Weast: Using A Social-Relations Approach To Determine The Allocation 
Of The Burden Of Proof In Special Education Due Process Hearings, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. 
JUV. L. & POL’Y 133 (2008); Nicole Thompson, The Great Burden On American 
Disabled Students: The Aftermath of Schaffer v. Weast, MOD. AM. Spring 2008, at 21; 
Jennifer M. Saba, Undue Deference: Toward A Dual System Of Burdens Under The 
Individuals With Disabilities Education Act, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 133 (2007); William 
D. White, Where To Place The Burden: Individuals With Disabilities Education Act 
Administrative Due Process Hearings, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1013 (2006); Jordan L. Wilson, 
Missing The Big Idea: The Supreme Court Loses Sight Of The Policy Behind The 
Individuals With Disabilities Education Act in Schaffer v. Weast, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 161 
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Leaving aside the questions of statutory construction and congressional 
intent, the practical implication of this decision on the lives of students 
without financial resources is undeniable. While this decision has harmed 
all children, for all of the reasons discussed above, it has a particularly 
disproportionate impact on families of children without financial 
resources.199  Those families cannot pay experts, will not have access to 
IEEs, and cannot afford to purchase the services on an up-front basis to 
establish a record of progress and success.  In those states where discovery 
is typically not a part of due process proceedings, all of the documents and 
evidence required to establish proof will be in the custody and control of 
the hearing officers.  Further, many families without resources have to 
proceed to due process without an attorney and, more likely than not, 
cannot obtain attorney’s fees unless a case proceeds all the way to a 
decision.  It is extremely difficult for a family in this situation to establish 
that a district failed to comply with the procedures and the substantive 
provisions of the IDEA in terms of whether an evaluation has been validly 
conducted or FAPE provided. 
Since most of the litigation under IDEA involves tuition reimbursement 
claims, districts are extremely concerned with keeping and shifting the 
burden back to parents.  There are few, if any, voices protecting the rights 
of other families in this dialogue, and the costs for districts are high.  In the 
wake of Schaffer, states have enacted legislation placing the burden on 
school districts,200 and a national legislative correction has been 
proposed.201  However, Schaffer remains the current general standard in 
most jurisdictions. 
                                                          
(2007); Kelly D. Thomason, Note, The Costs of a “Free” Education: The Impact of 
Schaffer v. Weast and Arlington v. Murphy on Litigation Under the IDEA, 57 DUKE 
L.J. 457 (2007). 
 199. See Thomason, supra note 198, at 457 (arguing that the Court’s decisions in 
Schaffer and Murphy disrupted a “prior trend in IDEA litigation . . . that had increased 
the substantive and procedural rights of children with disabilities”).  
 200. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-76d-e(1) (West 2011); DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 14, § 3140 (2011); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-8.02a(g) (2009); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 18A:46-1.1 (West 2011); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4404(1)(c) (McKinney 2011); see 
also Karger, supra note 198, at 208-15.  Even though the New York Legislature 
adopted the change recently in 2007, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg is 
already trying to take advantage of budget cuts to convince the Governor and 
Legislature to reverse the burden of proof statute.  See Michael Bloomberg, Mayor, 
New York City, N.Y., State Budget Testimony (Feb. 2, 2011), available at 
http://www.wnyc.org/articles/its-free-country/2011/feb/07/transcript-bloombergs-state-
budget-testimony/. 
 201. See, e.g., IDEA Fairness Restoration Act, H.R. 1208, 112th Cong. (2011); 
IDEA Fairness Restoration Act, S. 613, 112th Cong. (2011). 
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L.  The IDEA Should Require Parental Consent Prior to a District’s 
Change in IEP, Placement, or FAPE 
The IDEA currently requires informed parental consent prior to any 
initial evaluation, reevaluation, and initial provision of special education 
services.202  The IDEA allows states to determine whether to require 
consent for any other activities, such as changes in IEP or placement.  
Thus, the only way for most parents to stop a school district from making a 
proposed change in classification, placement, IEP, or FAPE is to file for 
due process, since such a parent has the right to insist that her child stays 
put in the child’s last agreed upon placement.203  Given that the balance of 
power, knowledge, and resources rests heavily with school districts, it 
should not be up to a parent to file for due process when a district proposes 
to make a change to a child’s last agreed upon educational program.  For 
families and young people without resources who do not have access to 
counsel, this requirement is extremely burdensome.  Although the student 
outcomes speak for themselves as to whether more than 2,000 parents have 
or should have a legitimate disagreement about the delivery of special 
education services, it seems clear that many parents that could or should be 
filing for due process are not doing so. 
III. PRIVATE AND PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF THE 
POOR MUST CONTINUE 
There are two principal paths to IDEA enforcement. The first is private 
and lawyer-driven. Cases are filed before an administrative agency—and 
possibly in court, on appeal—on behalf of individual students seeking 
anything from a change in placement or tuition reimbursement to new or 
more related services, independent assessment, or compensatory education 
or services.  Cases may also be filed on behalf of a class of students.  The 
most expensive and time consuming litigation is that filed in a trial court; 
administrative complaints are another alternative.  The second path to 
enforcement is public, and considerably weaker. Its approach is largely 
regulatory and investigative, conducted by state and federal bureaucrats, 
with litigation by public attorneys remaining, at best, a theoretical final step 
in the process. 
One answer to equalizing options for unrich families is to give them 
access to pro bono or prepaid private attorneys. While this may be the best 
                                                          
 202. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(D)(i)(I) (2006). 
 203. § 1415(j) (“[D]uring any proceedings conducted pursuant to this section, unless 
the State or local educational agency and the parents otherwise agree, the child shall 
remain in the then-current educational placement of the child, or, if applying for initial 
admission to a public school, shall, with the consent of the parents, be placed in the 
public school program until all such proceedings have been completed.”). 
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option, it is not a promising one, given the political climate and budget 
deficits at all levels of government.204 Nevertheless, it is clear from the 
discussion above that lawyers play a crucial role and are often the key to 
unlocking obstacles to meaningful placement and services under IDEA. 
How, then, can private litigation spur positive externalities205 for the benefit 
of students whose families are unable to file due process complaints or 
lawsuits? 
A. More Attorneys Need to be Recruited Under the Existing Statutory 
Scheme 
The National Council on Disability (NCD) has long urged engaging 
attorneys not traditionally associated with disability rights, such as those in 
private bar associations and legal services.206 These lawyers should 
represent almost exclusively clients without means to pay a retainer.  As for 
private bar involvement, the Illinois protection and advocacy agency,207 for 
example, has had a particularly successful program training and retaining 
members of the private bar to handle individual cases on a no-fee or fee 
recovery basis,208 in addition to their own substantial caseloads. Offices 
receiving Legal Services Corporation (LSC) funding are also well suited to 
dedicate staff attorneys to representation of children from low-income 
families on IDEA matters. These offices are accustomed to handling 
administrative adjudications. Furthermore, of the many restrictions 
Congress has placed on LSC civil practice areas over the years, individual 
special education cases remain on the acceptable docket.209 
                                                          
 204. Eloise Pasachoff, Special Education, Poverty, and the Limits of Private 
Enforcement, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1413, 1455 (2011) (offering a forthright, if 
pessimistic, assessment of this option: “Given the antilawyer trend of the last few 
reauthorizations, it is unlikely that a proposal to inject private advocates wholesale 
would succeed. In addition, given concerns that special education budgets are draining 
general education budgets, there is likely to be political resistance to the idea of 
providing a personal advocate to children with disabilities, on top of all of the other 
individualized extras that some feel these children are already receiving.  This proposal 
is not likely to gain any traction.”). 
 205. Id. at 1437-59 (defining positive externalities, transaction costs). 
 206. NCD REP. 2000, supra note 13. 
 207. Under 42 U.S.C. § 15043, each state and territory is required to establish a 
“protection and advocacy” agency “of last resort” to advocate, at no cost, on behalf of 
the human rights of persons with intellectual, developmental, mental health, physical, 
sensory and other disabilities. § 15043.  Most “P & As” have staff lawyers and/or lay 
advocates who represent students and parents in an array of special education matters 
ranging from IEP meetings to mediations and from due process hearings to court 
appeals and class action litigation. 
 208. Staff attorneys train, mentor, and oversee cases handled by private counsel who 
represent clients pro bono or recover fees from the school district if the parent and 
student are the prevailing party.  See Programs & Services, EQUIP FOR EQUALITY, 
http://equipforequality.org/programs (last visited June 17, 2011). 
 209. 45 C.F.R. §§ 1610.4(d), 1612 et seq., 1620.3 (2011).  Clients of legal services 
offices must meet financial eligibility guidelines tied to U.S. poverty-level incomes.  § 
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An increasing number of law school clinics are devoting their caseloads 
to child advocacy or to special education representation in particular.210  
Most of these clinics are staffed by attorneys with prior practice 
experience, although not necessarily in special education. The mediation 
and due process cases are amenable to the clinical model of learning plus 
service. With an ongoing and adequate supply of student participants, these 
clinics are able to serve a larger number of clients. 
B. Class Actions Should Continue, but Must be Outcome-Oriented and 
Narrowly Focused 
Class action lawsuits are a conventional tool used by public interest 
lawyers for systemic reform of government institutions211 and school 
systems, in particular.212 As with any class-wide injunctive order or 
settlement, the benefit for an individual class member may be hard to 
measure. With respect to delivery of special education, these cases rarely 
result in a tailored program of instruction and services for an individual 
low-income student. Nevertheless, it is possible to obtain some of the relief 
that would enhance the educational outcomes of low-income youth and 
eliminate obstacles in some of the areas discussed above, including 
timeliness and adequacy of notice; timeliness of independent evaluations; 
prior consent; emergency procedures; and due process for students in 
disciplinary or truancy proceedings. 
A number of district- or state-wide class actions have been litigated 
under the IDEA, with mixed success.213  While it is beyond the scope of 
                                                          
1611.3. 
 210. See generally, Massey & Rosenbaum, supra note 149, at 295-325 (describing a 
variety of clinical models and cases handled).  A new advocacy textbook, with chapters 
authored by current clinicians, has just been published: SPECIAL EDUCATION 
ADVOCACY (Ruth Colker & Julie Waterstone eds., 2011). 
 211. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Wilson, 942 F. Supp. 1252 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (ordering 
statewide accommodations and modifications for disabled prison inmate); Knop v. 
Johnson, 667 F. Supp. 467 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (requiring prison to provide inmates 
with adequate winter clothing and access to lavatories); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. 
Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (challenging treatment of  persons with mental illness at 
state hospital); see also Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection on 
Law and Organizing, 48 UCLA. L. REV. 443, 444 (2001) (citing cases). 
 212. See, e.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (remedying a school system’s 
failure to provide English language instruction to non-English speaking students); 
Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 408 (N.J. 1990) (challenging statewide school finance 
scheme); Williams v. California, No. 312236 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 14, 2000) (statewide 
settlement to provide textbooks in K-12 schools and upgrade teacher qualifications and 
school facilities); see also Charles Sabel & William Simon, Destabilization Rights: 
How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1016 (2004) (citing cases). 
 213. See, e.g., Corey H. v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F. Supp. 900, 918 (N.D. Ill. 1998) 
(finding Board of Education in violation of the IDEA); Beth V. ex rel. Yvonne V. v. 
Carroll, 87 F.3d 80, 89 (3d Cir. 1996) (leaving open possibility of a right of action 
under IDEA); Emma C. v. Eastin, No. C 96-4179 TEH, 2009 WL 482261 (N.D. Cal. 
Feb. 25, 2009) (providing history of settlement proceedings); N.J. Prot. & Advocacy, 
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this Article to critique the effectiveness of those efforts and the orders and 
settlements they produce, recent legal and policy analyses of some of the 
major cases are instructive for future lawsuits that may be brought on 
behalf of families without means.214 
After serving as court monitor in a number of long-running class actions, 
Education Professor and former OSEP Director Thomas Hehir posits that 
lawyers need to be guided by five principles in class action litigation: know 
the research and better educational practices; promote data-based 
agreements; promote more litigation focused systematically on changing 
practice; focus intervention; and join states as defendants.215 
In a recent assessment of the role of courts in implementing IDEA, 
professor and disability rights litigator Samuel Bagenstos concluded that in 
fact, not much litigation has been filed under the IDEA,216 and direct court 
intervention has made little direct difference in the treatment of students 
with disabilities.217  Bagenstos does agree with commentators and critics 
who claim there is an excessive focus on process over substance—at least 
“at the margins.” 218  That said, school administrators are likely to correctly 
implement court decisions when the decisions address broad, programmatic 
questions with clear rules that can be followed by administrators.219 
Nevertheless, Supreme Court jurisprudence has exacerbated problems 
                                                          
Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Educ., 563 F. Supp. 2d 474, 492 (D. N.J. 2008) (allowing claims 
under the  IDEA against Department of Education and Board of Education to progress 
while denying claims against individual Board members); Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. 
Schs., 519 F. Supp. 2d 870 (E.D. Wis. 2007) (declaring preference for mutual 
agreement over litigation); Blackman v. Dist. of Columbia, 454 F. Supp. 2d 1, 15 
(D.D.C. 2006) (reaffirming consent decree and noting a “hopeful moment” for the 
children of District of Columbia); Smith v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., No. CV 93-7044-
LEW (C.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 1996) (reaffirming consent decree); Jose P. v. Ambach, 557 
F. Supp. 1230 (E.D.N.Y 1983) (discussing slow progress made by the city to enact 
systems change). 
 214. See, e.g., Thomas Hehir, Looking Forward: Toward A New Role in Promoting 
Educational Equity for Students with Disabilities from Low-Income Backgrounds, in 
HANDBOOK OF EDUCATION POLICY RESEARCH 831, 836-37 (Gary Sykes et al. eds., 
2009); Bagenstos, Judiciary’s Role, supra note 29, at 126.  See generally Pasachoff, 
supra, note 204 (noting difficulties inherent in class actions). 
 215. Hehir, supra note 214, at 837-39.  Professor Hehir also advocates more free 
counsel for low-income families in due process hearings.  Id. at 837.  He believes this 
“utopian” proposal could be accomplished by funding more protection and agency staff 
to selectively represent clients with more significant disabilities in LRE cases.  Id. 
 216. Fewer than one hundred class actions with IDEA claims have been certified 
and these involve only one percent of the nation’s school districts.  Bagenstos, 
Judiciary’s Role, supra note 29 at 126.  Not surprisingly, most of these cases are filed 
in high income districts.  See Pasachoff, supra note 204, at 1426 (citing a 1999-2000 
national study). 
 217. Pasachoff, supra note 204, at 1414. 
 218. Compare Hehir, supra note 214, at 837 (finding that focus on procedural 
elements leads to oversight and enforcement), with Bagenstos, Judiciary’s Role, supra 
note 29 at 124-26. 
 219. Bagenstos, Judiciary’s Role, supra note 29, at 124.  
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experienced by poor children.  We have already discussed the lack of 
expert cost recovery due to Murphy220 and the burden of proof obstacles 
posed by Schaffer.221  Three other Supreme Court cases discussed above, 
Burlington, Carter, and Forest Grove, have opened the door for nonpublic 
school tuition reimbursement. 222  While we noted the difficulties this 
creates for families who cannot pay the tuition up front, we have not 
addressed the fact that this placement, if and when obtained, has spawned a 
two-tiered school system: those who can get a private school education at 
public expense and those who cannot.223 
The Supreme Court is also the author—or enabler—of the procedurally-
oriented interpretation of IDEA, as first announced in Rowley.224  It is true 
that the IDEA legislation was largely promoted by parent advocates who 
crafted built-in protections for themselves and their children with 
disabilities—in the form of the procedural safeguards discussed above.225 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court may have relied too heavily on the 
IDEA’s procedural terms and the alleged “ardent advocacy” that would be 
pursued by parents226 to the detriment of a substantive standard.  Rowley 
gives school districts a strong disincentive to focus on substance; hence, 
administrators can follow well the rules on process.227  As noted above, 
poor children and their families are not likely to advocate with ardor, and 
they will be among those who fail when challenging a particular program 
placement or related services. 
Class action cases that result in mandating more process or greater 
resource allocations for special education students do not necessarily 
advance overall educational equity for the rich or unrich.228  
                                                          
 220. See supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
 221. See supra notes 187-95 and accompanying text. 
 222. See supra notes 76-79, 83-85 and accompanying text. 
 223. Bagenstos, Judiciary’s Role, supra note 29, at 126.  This underscores the 
argument that there are no positive externalities that flow from one student’s filing for 
due process where the student who prevails may exit the public schools in favor of a 
private placement. See Pasachoff, supra note 204, at 1435.  
 224. See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 209 (1982). 
 225. See supra notes 58-75 and accompanying text. 
 226. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 209 (recognizing the importance of parental 
involvement in the planning of students’ educational programs and observing that 
parents and guardians will “not lack ardor” in ensuring that their children receive all the 
educational benefits to which they are entitled under IDEA); Rosenbaum, Aligning or 
Maligning?, supra note 140, at 10. 
 227. Bagenstos, Judiciary’s Role, supra note 29, at 124. Furthermore, as Rowley’s 
more recent federal court progeny show deference to school administrators in 
educational decision-making, those decisions are harder for parents to undo through 
litigation.  Id. at 125-26. 
 228. The long-running Jose P. v. Ambach litigation caused one writer to quip that 
New York City’s regular education program resembles “a parking lot full of 1968 cars, 
while special ed is like a handful of shiny Cadillacs.”  Kay S. Hymnowitz, Special Ed: 
Kids Go In, But They Don’t Come out, CITY J., Summer 1996, available at 
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Notwithstanding the negative externalities for students without 
disabilities—or other disabled students—who may be the by-product of 
class litigation victories, experts agree that focused special education 
litigation with outcome-based objectives is more successful than process-
oriented, broad-based “totality” litigation,229 even if the positive consent 
decrees and injunctions owe more to lawyers’ strategic decisions than 
anything inherent in IDEA. 
C. Systemic Administrative Compliance Complaints are a Cost-Effective 
and Delay-Reducing Tool 
One underutilized vehicle for IDEA dispute resolution is the 
administrative compliance complaint.230  Like a class action lawsuit, it is 
lawyer-dependent, but can potentially bring broad-based relief without the 
cost and delays of civil litigation.  Its affordability and accessibility offer 
more incentives for attorneys to challenge systemic processes that harm 
low-income students and families as much as, or more than, special 
education students in general. 
Each state education agency (SEA) is required to have written 
procedures that provide for the filing of a complaint against a school 
district or local education agency (LEA), another public agency or against 
the SEA, asserting violations of IDEA’s statutory or regulatory 
mandates.231  Complaints can address both individual and systemic issues. 
Like due process hearings, complaints can be used to resolve any matter 
                                                          
http://www.city-journal.org/html/6_3_special_ed.html.  The irony of the auto metaphor 
is that it was infamously used by one court to hold that under the IDEA, students are 
entitled to a Chevy-like education, but not a Cadillac.  Doe ex rel. Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 
9 F.3d 455, 459-60 (6th Cir. 1993) (“[The board of education] is not required to 
provide a Cadillac [to a disabled pupil, but the] educational equivalent of a serviceable 
Chevrolet.”).  The argument has been made elsewhere that the line separating disabled 
youngsters from those needing (non-disability) remediation or interventions is not a 
bright one, and that perhaps all students should be entitled to the benefits and 
protections afforded under the IDEA.  See, e.g., Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Full Sp[]ed 
Ahead: Expanding the IDEA to Let All Children Ride the Same Bus, 4 STAN. J. C.R &. 
C.L. 373, 384-92 (2008). 
 229. Bagenstos, Judiciary’s Role, supra note 29, at 130; see also, Hehir, supra note 
214, at 838-39. 
 230. The Southern Disability Law Center and Southern Poverty Law Center through 
the efforts of Attorneys Jim Comstock-Galagan and Ronald K. Lospennato are to be 
credited with promoting the theory and practice of filing effective administrative 
complaints.  See S. DISABILITY LAW CTR., http://www.sdlcenter.org (last visited Sept. 
3, 2011); S. POVERTY LAW CTR., http://www.splcenter.org (last visited Sept. 3, 2011). 
 231. 34 C.F.R. § 300.151 (2011).  The violation must have occurred within one year 
of the date the complaint is received, as compared to the two-year period for requesting 
due process; states may allow for a longer period.  Letter from Kenneth R. Warlick, 
Director, Office of Special Educ. Programs, to Chief State School Officers, at 3 (July 
17, 2000), available at http://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/2000-
3/osep002071700safeguardssec.pdf; see also 71 Fed. Reg. 46,589, 46,601, 46,605 
(Aug. 14, 2006).  
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related to the identification, evaluation, educational placement, related 
services or compensatory education of the child.232  Complaints also can be 
used to resolve the provision of FAPE to the child, as well as any other 
allegation that a public agency has violated IDEA provisions governing 
assessment, program planning and outcomes and procedural safeguards.233 
Just as in class litigation relief, a corrective action can lead to changes in 
policies and procedures, additional or different services, compensatory 
education, reimbursement, or the provision of future educational 
services.234  Special masters, monitors, or consultants can conceivably be 
appointed to oversee or assist with implementing a corrective action plan.  
Parents may use the complaint procedures or due process to resolve any 
disagreement with the school district.  Issues in the complaint that are not 
the subject of due process must be investigated by SEA within sixty 
days.235 
The complaint may be filed by anyone, including an organization, an 
individual student, a protection and advocacy organization, an interested 
community, or an out-of-state person.236  The SEA must issue written 
decisions that address each allegation, including findings of fact and 
conclusions and reasons for its decision.237  States are encouraged to offer 
mediation prior to resolution, but it must be voluntary and the SEA must 
bear the cost.238  The SEA must provide for “effective implementation” of 
its final decision, including the provision of technical assistance, 
negotiations, and corrective action necessary to achieve compliance.239 
                                                          
 232. See Letter from Kenneth R. Warlick, supra note 231, at 4; see also 71 Fed. 
Reg. 46,601, 46,605. 
 233. See Letter from Kenneth R. Warlick, supra note 231, at 4; see also 71 Fed. 
Reg. 46,601, 46,605. 
 234. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.151(b), 300.152(a)(5); 71 Fed. Reg. 46,602; see Letter from 
William W. Knudsen, Acting Director, Office of Special Educ. Programs, to Dr. John 
Copenhaver, Director, Mountain Plains Reg’l Res. Ctr. (Oct. 31, 2008), available at 
http://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/2008-
4/copenhaver103108correction-noncompliance4q2008.pdf 
 235. § 300.152(c); see Letter from Kenneth R. Warlick, supra note 231, at 3-5; see 
also 71 Fed. Reg. 46,604-05.  The SEA has sixty calendar days from receipt to 
complete an investigation—conducting an on-site investigation, if necessary.  § 
300.152(a).  The complainant must be able to submit additional information, orally or 
in writing and the public agency must be able to respond to complaint.  Id.; see Letter 
from Kenneth R. Warlick, supra note 231, at 8; see also 71 Fed. Reg. 46,602.  The 
timeline can be extended for exceptional circumstances (e.g., systemic complaint).  § 
300.152 (b).  The complainant and LEA can agree to extend timeline for purposes of 
mediation.  Id. 
 236. See § 300.151(a)(1) (stating the agency must adopt procedures for “[r]esolving 
any complaint, including a complaint filed by an organization or individual from 
another State”). 
 237. § 300.152(a)(5). 
 238. § 300.152(b)(1)(ii); see Letter from Kenneth R. Warlick, supra note 231, at 7; 
see also 71 Fed. Reg. 46,603-04. 
 239. § 300.153(b)(2). 
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The state agency may itself be the object of a compliance complaint, in 
which case the SEA may contract with an independent third party for the 
investigation and decision-rendering, while still complying with all 
procedural and remediation steps.240  Although there is no guarantee that 
the SEA will conduct the investigation with the intended vigor and rigor, its 
failure to do so can be the basis of a second administrative complaint or 
lawsuit, with a considerable evidentiary record already laid out.  The failure 
to conduct an adequate investigation, to devise an adequate remedy241 or to 
investigate or remediate contrary to federal regulations242 have been the 
subjects of successful litigation. 
Compliance complaint remedies have included: (1) school- or district-
wide positive behavior interventions, with training for all staff; (2) 
improvements in transition services and vocational training programs; (3) 
intensive reading and math remediation for students more than two years 
behind their chronological grade level; (4) elimination of policies and 
practices, such as a shortened school day, that result in students receiving 
less services than they need; (5) strategies for moving students from more 
restrictive to less restrictive placements; and (6) significant increase in the 
frequency and duration of related services.243 
This administrative procedure, when skillfully negotiated, can yield 
systemic reforms, including those that target poor children and youth, in 
such areas as failure to provide appropriate related services, failure to 
develop behavioral intervention programs, failure to timely evaluate 
students, inadequate levels of social work and counseling services, and lack 
of mental health services.  The negotiating will likely need attorney 
expertise and a lot of chutzpah, but at a fraction of the time and cost of 
class action litigation.244  Of course, this approach may need to be used 
with complementary community organizing and media strategies and co-
counseling with some of the established public interest law firms and 
                                                          
 240. § 300.153(b)(1); see Letter from Kenneth R. Warlick, supra note 231, at 9; see 
also 71 Fed. Reg. 46,602-03. 
 241. See, e.g., Chavez v. Bd. of Educ, 614 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1208 (D. N.M. 2009) 
(recognizing that courts may require SEA to provide services directly to disabled 
children when LEA has failed to do so); see also, Corey H. v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F. 
Supp. 900, 904-05 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (noting that the SEA made no effort to take 
corrective action with respect to district violations of LRE regulations). 
 242. See, e.g., Beth V. ex rel. Yvonne V. v. Carroll, 87 F.3d 80, 88 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(alleging that the SEA consistently failed to investigate and timely resolve IDEA 
complaints). 
 243. For sample systemic compliance complaints, responses, and settlements from 
school districts in Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi see Case Docket, S. POVERTY 
LAW CTR., http://splcenter.org/get-informed/case-docket/ (last visited June 17, 2011). 
 244. In particular, the standing is liberally construed and there is no need to pay 
court costs, to certify a class, propound or respond to discovery, or engage in law and 
motion practice.  There may be expert or consultant costs, however. 
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private counsel.245 
D. The U.S. Department of Education Has Authority to Aggressively 
Monitor Districts and States 
In her thoughtful analysis, relying in part on a market paradigm, 
Professor Eloise Pasachoff writes: 
In the absence of a viable private enforcement strategy for low-income 
children, the question becomes whether the public enforcement system 
can do better.  It can.  While there are theoretical concerns with public 
enforcement in general, and practical concerns with public enforcement 
of the IDEA as a historical matter, there is nonetheless a need for 
government interventions that focus on low-income children; that have a 
broad geographical reach; that avoid the need for individuals to raise 
claims on their own behalf; that create positive externalities beyond the 
scope of any particular intervention; and that incentivize the relevant 
parties to provide appropriate special education services for low-income 
children.246 
Professor Pasachoff notes that the state complaint system attempts to 
counter the problem of “externalities.”247  As discussed above, any time an 
SEA resolves a complaint by finding a failure to provide appropriate 
services, the written decision must address corrective action as to the 
particular child as well as “appropriate future provision of services for all 
children with disabilities.”248 
In a sweeping departure from the existing law, Congress established a 
detailed scheme in 2004 for monitoring compliance and enforcement.249 
The centerpiece was “focused monitoring.”250  Its aim was to improve 
“educational results and functional outcomes,” with particular attention to 
providing FAPE in the least restrictive environment, transition services, 
state supervision of complaint resolution, and overrepresentation of racial 
and ethnic minorities through inappropriate policies and practices.251  In her 
                                                          
 245. There are also disadvantages to this strategy, for example, almost certainly no 
attorney fees.  But see Lucht v. Molalla River Sch. Dist., 225 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 
2000); Upper Valley Assoc. for Handicapped Citizens v. Mills, 928 F. Supp. 429 (D. 
Vt. 1996).  Moreover, there is less control by plaintiffs—and their lawyers—over the 
process and school districts may file individual due process complaints to stay the 
compliance investigation.  Under 34 C.F.R. § 300.152(c), the State must set aside a 
complaint if due process is requested on the same issue.  34 C.F.R. § 300.152(c) 
(2006).  Finally, the quality of state monitors and administrators cannot be 
overestimated.  If dissatisfied with results of the investigation, plaintiffs will most 
likely still need to exhaust due process procedures. 
 246. Pasachoff, supra note 204, at 1461.  
 247. Id. at 1440-41. 
 248. § 300.151(b)(2). 
 249. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1416-17 (2006). 
 250. Id. 
 251. §§ 1402, 1416(a)(3), (b). 
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review, the Secretary of Education is supposed to rely primarily on student 
performance on state assessments—including alternate assessments, 
dropout rates and graduation rates, and local and state compliance plans 
developed by the states.252 
In theory, there is a complex scheme of graduated sanctions, based on 
standards such as “lack of satisfactory progress” for two consecutive years, 
“substantial noncompliance,” and “egregious noncompliance.”  Early 
stages of noncompliance typically result in corrective action plans.  When a 
school district fails to correct, additional actions are available, for example, 
fund recovery, withholding funds, and suspension of payments and referral 
to the Department of Justice (DOJ).253  In practice, the monitoring and 
enforcement have proven to be weak and disappointing. With the proper 
bureaucratic initiative, this mechanism has potential to directly or indirectly 
target districts with high levels of students from poor families. 
The National Council on Disability (NCD) addressed the subject of 
oversight extensively in one of its special education reports.  The 2004 
reauthorization offered a more explicit means of enforcement than the 1997 
IDEA amendments.  The Department of Education’s previous practice of 
placing “special conditions” on new state grants had been criticized as 
politicizing.254  While seemingly limited to certain performance indicators, 
the new provisions have the potential to remedy some of the NCD 
criticisms about lack of focus and unclear standards for determining 
whether noncompliance is systemic, particularly in low-income districts. 
The NCD also recommended more collaboration between the parent 
training centers and the protection and advocacy agencies in developing a 
statewide special education advocacy strategy.255  The strength and vitality 
of publicly funded—but nongovernmental—actors can be more easily 
predicted and controlled for securing broad-based IDEA compliance than 
that of public sector officials and their political overseers whose job might 
be to accomplish the very same thing. 
E. The Department of Education Can Collect and Disclose Data 
We have discussed the problems poor families face in obtaining 
adequate and comprehensible information about special education 
processes. These kinds of “informational asymmetries” among parents and 
between parents and schools, as well as imperfect overall information about 
types of services that might be available and useful, warrant reliance on 
                                                          
 252. § 1416(b). 
 253. § 1416(e). 
 254. NCD REP. 2000, supra note 13 at 35, 37. 
 255. Id. at 71. 
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public enforcement and implementation mechanisms.256 
The United States Department of Education, as noted earlier, does 
collect special education data on such things as racial disproportionality, 
state implementation of IDEA, and student dropouts.257  The Department is 
also required to annually collect data from SEAs concerning the number 
and percentage of disabled students (by race, ethnicity, limited English 
proficiency status, gender, and disability category) who are: receiving 
FAPE, participating in regular and separate classes, being disciplined, have 
completed or terminated special education services, and have filed for a 
due process hearing, among other remedies.258 
While useful for planning and some forms of monitoring and 
enforcement, there is no data that directly focuses on the needs of children 
from families without means, and there is no explicit mandate to 
disseminate this information. If the information disclosure requirement is to 
be expanded, we must also ensure that parents are sufficiently informed 
about their rights and services options through agents who are independent 
of the federal, state, and local educational bureaucracies.  If ardent 
advocacy is to be the norm for all parents, irrespective of socio-economic 
class, it will require creative and community-based outreach strategies and 
the distribution of many “advo-kits.”259 
IV.  LEGISLATIVE AGENDA FOR CONGRESS 
The following proposals all follow from the above discussion of the 
plight of families without the means to negotiate special education 
processes.  Most of these are obvious to education advocates and 
policymakers.  What is chiefly lacking at the present time is political will, 
immobilized by both ideology and budgetary constraints. Although even 
modest federal legislation260 can be a target for fiscal slings or political 
arrows, we are compelled to record the following legislative objectives for 
future consideration. 
 
                                                          
 256. Pasachoff, supra note 204, at 1439. 
 257. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text. 
 258. § 1418(a)(1)(A); see Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments 
of 1997, Pub. L. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37, 101-02 (1997); see also Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-446, § 101, 118 Stat. 
2647, 2738-40 (2004). 
 259. See Rosenbaum, Aligning or Maligning?, supra note 140, at 10 (noting that 
when the IDEA was last considered for reauthorization, a group of San Francisco Bay 
Area lawyers and self-help providers suggested, only half in jest, that parents be 
furnished “advo-kits” as part of a massive grassroots educational campaign).  
 260. Many of the same political and budgetary factors are also at play at the state 
and local governmental levels.  However, there may be opportunities for some of these 
legislative initiatives to be considered by state legislatures and boards of education. 
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A. Clarify That Prospective Funding for Tuition and Services is Available 
as a Self-Help Remedy 
It is important for Congress to clarify that the remedy of private school 
tuition in the absence of FAPE is not a remedy only available for wealthy 
families.  The statute and regulations should clarify that both prospective 
tuition funding and satisfaction of a debt—or retroactive direct payment to 
a school—are valid remedies.  Further, the IDEA should be amended to 
include that private funding for services, and not just private school tuition, 
is appropriate where FAPE has been denied. 
B. Expand IEE Provisions to Improve Access for Families 
Congress should consider expanding the right of an IEE to parents and 
students who have not been timely evaluated or have been denied an 
evaluation, or where there has been a “child find” violation, which has 
forced the parents to seek an IEE. 
Further, the IDEA should be clarified to avoid a narrow interpretation of 
the concept of “evaluation.”  If a district conducts an evaluation but fails to 
include an assessment in one particular area that would be obviously 
required in any particular case, such as speech and language or assistive 
technology, a parent should have the right to an IEE. 
C. Incorporate the Compensatory Education Remedy into the Statute 
An amendment to incorporate the remedy of compensatory education for 
a denial of FAPE into the statute is extremely important to ensure that the 
rights of children without financial resources are protected. As it stands 
now, most parents whose children are being denied FAPE do not realize 
they have any remedy. Including compensatory education in the statute 
would not only address this problem, but would ensure equity across the 
states. 
D. Create Emergency and Interim Hearing Procedures 
As noted above, the IDEA’s due process procedures are supposed to 
function in an environment that is in compliance with the statute.  
However, the reality is different.  Thus, emergencies outside of the 
disciplinary context frequently arise, for example, unenforced IEPs, the 
need for an IEE, and the right to prospective tuition funding. These 
situations cannot be addressed effectively through the current due process 
system. 
E. Strengthen the Notice and Safeguard Provisions 
The IDEA should be amended to ensure that the notice and safeguard 
provisions actually serve to protect the rights of parents with limited 
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literacy or English language abilities and allow them to participate in the 
process.  Toward that end, the IDEA should include a provision granting 
parents the right to receive educational records translated into their own 
language and making these records accessible to parents who lack 
sufficient literacy skills.  Further, the IDEA should be amended to require 
districts to provide a written description of the special education process in 
addition to procedural safeguards.  Moreover, the regulations should be 
amended to expressly prohibit boilerplate language for notices. 
F. Expand and Clarify Students’ Rights 
The topic of students’ rights and the IDEA, is an extensive one that goes 
beyond the scope of this Article.  The IDEA’s provisions concerning 
transfer of rights, notices, and safeguards for youth ages sixteen to twenty-
one should be completely revisited in light of the realities of student 
outcomes.  At a minimum, the IDEA should be amended to ensure that 
regardless of transfer of rights, both parents and students over sixteen 
should receive annual notices of rights and safeguards. 
G. Expand Disciplinary Protections, Right to FAPE and Services to 
Expressly Include Truant Students 
Adoption of specific provisions concerning truancy and absenteeism are 
critical to ensuring more effective outcomes for students with disabilities. 
The IDEA and its regulations should be amended to clarify that truant 
students, like those who are suspended, are still entitled to FAPE.  
Additionally, the law should be clarified to expressly indicate that truancy 
or absenteeism that interferes with learning is both a “lack of progress” that 
must be addressed as part of an annual review or that may trigger a review, 
and is also a “behavior” justifying a functional behavior assessment and 
positive behavioral supports.  Further, truant students should have the same 
procedural requirements as those subject to discipline.  The IDEA should 
also be clarified to prohibit schools from using family courts to address 
truancy, since those issues should be addressed under the IDEA. 
H. Reinstate the Right to Expert Witness Fees for Prevailing Parties 
Organizations representing families of children with disabilities are 
currently working to correct the Supreme Court’s decision in Murphy.261 
Congress and state legislatures have addressed the Court’s decisions 
                                                          
 261. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF PARENT ATTORNEYS & ADVOCATES, INC., AN 
INCREASINGLY UNEVEN PLAYING FIELD: SUPREME COURT DECISIONS AND IDEA 2004 
CONCERNS (2007), available at http://www.copaa.org/wp-
content/uploads/2010/04/Leveling-Playing-Field_Bullets_112807.pdf. 
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individually.262 
I. Shift the Burden of Meeting IDEA Requirements to School Districts and 
Require Informed Consent for a Change in IEP, Placement, or FAPE 
As discussed, it is extremely difficult for families without financial 
resources to bear the burden of proof of the IDEA’s requirements, obtain 
attorneys, IEEs, expert witnesses, or generate a track record of success in a 
private placement.  It makes sense that a student’s family must prove that 
any private services they seek are appropriate if those services have not 
been previously agreed to by the IEP team.  However, it seems inconsistent 
with the intent of the due process provisions to place on parents the burden 
of proving non-compliance with the statute, particularly when the evidence 
of compliance is within full control of the district and discovery is rarely 
permitted. 
Further, allowing school districts to change IEPs and placements unless 
parents invoke due process has a disproportionate impact on families who 
cannot afford lawyers, or who do not understand and cannot navigate the 
system, and whose children are at greater risk of educational segregation, 
discipline and dropping out. Requiring parental consent for non-
disciplinary IEP and placement changes would be a critical step in 
balancing the power between districts and unrich families. As noted, some 
states have already adopted statutes placing the burden of proof on the 
school district.263  Federal legislation should be enacted to do the same for 
all students across the nation. 
J. Reinstate the Catalyst Theory for Attorney’s Fees 
The Buckhannon holding264 must be reversed by Congress, allowing 
litigants to shift attorney’s fees to defendants, including school districts 
who are parties to settlements that lack a court’s imprimatur. 
K. Increase the Number of Publicly Funded Attorneys 
When the IDEA was last amended, the Senate bill contained language 
designed to ensure that states spend funds to support the state protection 
and advocacy systems in advising and assisting parents in the areas of 
                                                          
 262. See supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.  A bill to amend the IDEA to 
permit a prevailing party to recover expert fees has been introduced twice in the House 
of Representatives, IDEA Fairness Restoration Act, H.R. 2740, 111th Cong. § 2 
(2009); IDEA Fairness Restoration Act, H.R. 4188, 110th Cong. 2d Sess. (2007), and 
there is currently a bill before the House of Representatives, IDEA Fairness Restoration 
Act, H.R. 1208, 112th Cong. (2011), and before the Senate, IDEA Fairness Restoration 
Act, S. 613, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 263. See supra note 188. 
 264. See supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
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dispute resolution,265 which arguably could include training on procedural 
safeguards involving notice, consent, assessment, rights to particular 
services, and placement. 
A more ambitious technical assistance and self-advocacy scheme was 
recommended by the NCD in its major review of IDEA.266  It called for the 
Department of Education to fund more lawyers to counsel clients, a 
national back-up center, and self-advocacy training programs for students 
with disabilities and their parents.267  The NCD found that the programs 
and services in most states were inadequate and called for funding a lawyer 
at every parent training center,268 a protection and advocacy agency, and an 
independent living center “to provide competent legal advice . . . .”269 
M. Conduct More Aggressive Investigations and Justice Department 
Litigation 
The NCD has long lamented the lack of a federal complaint system, 
which distinguishes IDEA from every other U.S. civil rights law.270 
Furthermore, the NCD found that under the current system, parents and 
other stakeholders were not adequately involved in the Department of 
Education’s on-site investigations or monitoring.271 
The Department of Education should not be the sole enforcement 
                                                          
 265. S. 1248, 108th Cong. § 611(e)(2)(B) (2003).  This would have provided the 
protection and advocacy agencies (P&As) with additional resources targeted 
specifically to handle the IDEA issues.  See id.  The P&As also publish a number of 
self-help special education materials. See generally DISABILITY RIGHTS CAL. & 
COMMUNITY ALLIANCE ON SPECIAL EDUCATION, SPECIAL EDUCATION RIGHTS & 
RESPONSIBILITIES (rev. 2011), available at 
http://www.disabilityrightsca.org/pubs/504001.pdf. 
 266. NCD REP. 2000, supra note 13. 
 267. Id.; see also Monica Costello, Note, Systemic Compliance Complaints: Making 
IDEA’s Enforcement Provisions a Reality, 41 U. MICH. L. REFORM 507, 523 (2008); 
Phillips, supra note 35, at 1842-52; Wakelin, supra note 32, at 283. 
 268. See NCD REP. 2000, supra note 13; see also 20 U.S.C. §§ 1482-84 (2006). 
“Parent training and information centers” are funded, in part, to meet the particular 
training and information needs of underserved parents and to assist them in 
understanding the availability of, and how to effectively use, procedural safeguards 
under IDEA, including alternative methods of dispute resolution.  § 1482(b).  Similarly 
“community parent resource centers” were created to give training and information to 
the “underserved parents of children with disabilities,” including those who are low-
income, have limited English proficiency or are themselves disabled.  § 1483(a). 
Clients of legal services offices must meet financial eligibility guidelines. 45 C.F.R. 
§1611.1 et seq. (2011). 
 269. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, BACK TO SCHOOL ON CIVIL RIGHTS (2000), 
available at http://www.ncd.gov/publications/2000/Jan252000. In 2000, the the 
National Council on Disability called for the establishment and funding of a protection 
and advocacy system specific to IDEA to be administered through the Department of 
Education. Id. at recommendation VII.7; see also Hehir, supra note 214, at 837 (calling 
for strategic litigation by P&A attorneys. 
 270. NCD REP. 2000, supra note 13, at 35, 37. 
 271. Id. 
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agency. The Department of Education has longstanding and collaborative 
relationships with state education administrators. This is an important 
relationship that is jeopardized when the Department of Education 
threatens sanctions. Partial solutions were included in the last 
reauthorization when enforcement authority was also given to the DOJ, but 
only following referral of cases from the Department of Education. “This 
has not worked for there have been no referrals to DOJ since that authority 
was added to the IDEA.”272  In 2002, the NCD recommended an expansive 
role for DOJ: “Congress should authorize and fund the [DOJ] to 
independently investigate and litigate IDEA cases, as well as administer a 
federal system for handling pattern and practice complaints filed by 
individuals.”273  This is consistent with the nation’s approach to 
discrimination in housing and employment, and would surely give leverage 
to students from poor families.274  The NCD also recommends adequate 
funding for enforcement, complaint handling, and technical assistance 
infrastructures, enabling the DOJ and Department of Education to support 
improvements in state compliance and ensure better outcomes for 
children.275 
The Fordham Foundation/Progressive Policy Institute also made 
recommendations in a report containing a detailed critique of the 
Department of Education status quo.276  The report charged that the 
traditional compliance-based model, with the 1997 amendments’ new 
regime of results-based accountability, was “merely grafted” onto the pre-
existing approach.277 
Monitoring is not only key to equalizing the leverage of parents without 
financial means, but “[s]trong monitoring and enforcement provisions are 
key to keeping states and school districts out of court.” 278 
                                                          
 272. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION 
ACT REAUTHORIZATION: WHERE DO WE REALLY STAND? (2002) [hereinafter NCD 
REP. 2002], available at http://www.ncd.gov/publications/2002/July52002. 
 273. NCD REP. 2002, supra note 273. 
 274. See Pasachoff, supra note 204, at 1422.  
 275. NCD REP. 2002, supra note 273, at recommendation 2. 
 276. Bryan C. Hassel & Patrick J. Wolf, Effectiveness and Accountability (Part 2): 
Alternatives to the Compliance Model, in RETHINKING SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR A NEW 
CENTURY, 309 (Chester E. Finn, Jr., et al. eds., 2001), available at 
http://www.dlc.org/documents/SpecialEd_ch14.pdf. 
 277. Id.  One of the more modest compliance alternatives recommended is “smart 
regulation.”  Id. at 311.  While regulators can still verify that parties are following basic 
norms of behavior and impose sanctions where necessary under this alternative, they 
may “deploy a broader range of tools” that have a free market tinge.  Id. at 311-12.  
This might include, “forging voluntary agreements; . . .  using information to spur good 
behavior; addressing underlying causes of noncompliance; and replacing procedural 
controls with after-the-fact checks.”  Id. at 312-17. 
 278. H.R. Rep. No. 108-77, at 380 (2003).  The House Minority recognized this 
when considering H.R. 1350, the last IDEA reauthorization bill: “We know that few, if 
any, states and school districts deliberately flout IDEA. Unfortunately, often the only 
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N. More Data Disclosures May be Useful 
A truly modest, but less costly proposal is to mandate more data 
collection—and dissemination—by the Department of Education, with an 
emphasis on factors that will help pinpoint the gaps in the specialized 
education of students from families without means.  According to 
regulatory policy theory, “[m]andating disclosure can be both less 
expensive and more efficient than command-and-control mechanisms, by 
giving people the information they need to make decisions rather than by 
requiring particular means or ends.”279  As discussed above, this will only 
be successful when the data is artfully exposed by organizations and 
advocates who can use it for the betterment of their clients. 
O. Congressional Mandates Affecting Children from Poor Families Should 
Be Linked to Federal Expenditures 
A final tool in the legislative toolbox is the congressional spending 
clause authority. Congress can impose more conditions on the states in 
exchange for providing IDEA funding, viz. improvement of services to 
poor children. The Department of Education’s Office of Special Education 
Programs has the authority to target the funds it wishes to withhold from 
LEAs that are not compliant, rather than withholding funds from the state 
as a whole.280  Congress could mandate that a state providing (or permitting 
its districts to provide) worse special education services to poor children 
than to wealthier children would not be in compliance with the law, and the 
federal government could therefore withhold funding.281 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has canvassed pressing issues of educational and social 
equity. Without diminishing the gains that the IDEA has generated for 
students with disabilities, a new phase in this perennially passionate civil 
and human rights struggle must soon be faced. The chief goal of this 
Article’s sketch of the salient issues, ones that will be confronted by 
                                                          
way a school district’s lack of compliance is discovered is when a parent pursues 
litigation.”  Id. 
 279. Pasachoff, supra note 204 at 1465 (citing Cass R. Sunstein, Informational 
Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 
624 (1999)). 
 280. 20 U.S.C. § 1416(e)(6) (2006); see also Thomas Hehir, IDEA and 
Disproportionality: Federal Enforcement, Effective Advocacy, and Strategies for 
Change, in RACIAL INEQUITY IN SPECIAL EDUCATION 219, 229 (Daniel J. Losen & Gary 
Orfield eds., 2002). 
 281. For a detailed explanation of this proposal see Pasachoff, supra note 204, at 
1474-75.  The mandate could either “require the same degree of excellence in special 
education services in every district around the state” or  “provide a weaker mandate, 
requiring only that individual districts would not be permitted to provide better services 
to wealthier children than to poor children.”  Id. at 1486.  
55
Hyman et al.: How IDEA Fails Families Without Means: Causes and Corrections Fro
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2011
HYMAN 10/13/11 12/8/201112:33:54 PM 
162 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 20:1 
parents, advocates, legislatures, policy-makers, and, inevitably, the courts, 
is to move the discourse forward.  We have presented several options, a 
number of which depend on legislative will, a better fiscal climate, or both.  
Ameliorating the disparities that currently exist will require strategic 
thinking, sustained advocacy, and a fearless commitment to equal 
educational opportunity. 
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